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                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                          SHERMAN DIVISION
    WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTD
                                      DOCKET NO. 4:18CV469
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    : SHERMAN, TEXAS
: APRIL 20, 2020
MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL : 1:30 P.M.
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    WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTC
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                                        DOCKET NO. 4:18CV501
    VS.
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    WELLS FARGO
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    WAPP TECHNOLOGY LTD
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                                      DOCKET NO. 4:18CV519
    VS.
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    BANK OF AMERICA
11
                      TELEPHONIC MARKMAN HEARING
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                BEFORE THE HONORABLE AMOS L. MAZZANT,
                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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    APPEARANCES (BY TELEPHONE):
14
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     PROCEEDINGS REPORTED BY MECHANICAL STENOGRAPHY, TRANSCRIPT
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    PRODUCED BY COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION.
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Good to have you all here via telephone. I would also point out I believe our technical adviser should be on the phone, David Keyzer.

And then I moved this from video to telephone just to be easier so I could do it in my courtroom. Our video conference room is actually across the street in the annex, and it was just easier for me to do this here, so I moved it here so I can spread things out here in the courtroom on the bench.

So I don't know if both sides have consulted with each other about if you want to rotate the order. It doesn't really matter to me, but let me check and see if somebody has a comment on that.

And I guess let me go ahead and call the case. It's 4:18CV469, 501 and 519, and we're set today for a Markman hearing. You've already made your appearances for the record. As my judicial assistant indicated, please identify yourself every time you speak so we can get a clear record.

And then has there been some discussion on who would like to speak first, from the Plaintiff, on the order we're going to proceed in today?

MR. DEVLIN: Your Honor, this is Tim Devlin on behalf of Wapp Technologies.

We have not discussed that. I would say a typical presentation is the Plaintiff would go first and we would go

sort of term by term. Of course, that's up to Your Honor. In other words, we would go on a term and then Defendants would go, and we would work through that and then we would move on to the next term and reset.

We have a little bit of upfront background and legal stuff that I would suggest we present as part of the first go-round, in other words, a little background and legal — obviously, recognizing the Court's familiarity with a lot of this subject matter. So the slides are comprehensive.

We'll be conservative but we will be able to breeze through some of that, and then go right into the first claim element, which we believe is the preamble, and then have Defendants go on that and then back and forth to whatever extent the Court may desire, and then move on to the next element.

I guess that's our suggestion from our perspective, but we're open, and certainly whatever the Court's preference is we would be happy to follow.

THE COURT: Okay. For the defense, who would like to comment on our procedure today?

MR. REITER: Hi, Your Honor. This is Mark Reiter.

I'm fine with what Mr. Devlin suggested. Having done a couple of hearings now with Your Honor, I understand that you'll give both sides an opportunity to speak as much as necessary, within the Court's patience. So if they would

like to proceed with a term first and then we get to respond, and we'll work through the term until Your Honor is satisfied, I have no problem with that.

I believe the parties have laid out in both the

briefing and the slides — and we just exchanged slide decks a few minutes ago, so I haven't had a chance to look through all of them, but we have laid out all of the terms in the same order, so that shouldn't be a problem.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. REITER: I think that's right. Isn't that right, Tim?

MR. DEVLIN: I believe that's correct. If somehow we get out of order, I'm sure we can adjust on the slides.

THE COURT: That's fine. And I will let you know, I have both of your slides pulled up on my computer here in the courtroom, so since we don't have the ability to see when the slide is changing, just let me know as we go through those slides.

So if you both want to, I guess we'll start with the Plaintiff first, if you have any background information, and then go straight into the first few terms dealing with the preamble. The only thing — and then we can hear from the defense on any background information you want to present and then a response to the first term and we'll go back and forth.

The one question I have is I know the last two terms in dispute, the defense argued they're indefinite. I don't know if defense wants to go first on those and then Plaintiff respond to those. Typically that's the way the Court has done that, but we can discuss that as we get to the end on those.

So if Plaintiff wants to go ahead and proceed, we'll go ahead and begin.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court.

May I ask Your Honor if there's any sort of expectation in regard to time limits today? I don't think we're going to take all that long. There's not a ton of terms. Both sides have a hundred or so slides, but I think there's a lot of signposting and so forth because we're on a telephonic hearing. But if Your Honor has guidance there, I would love to know that just so we can try to meet the Court's expectation in terms of total time today.

THE COURT: Well, typically Markmans last two -- two hours, no more than three. But because we're having to deal with the virus and our docket, you have the afternoon, but I hope you don't take the whole afternoon.

MR. DEVLIN: Understood, Your Honor. I think somewhere right in the midst of those estimates is probably where we'll end up without any trouble at all.

THE COURT: Okay. Sounds great.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. So, again, Tim Devlin. May it please the Court.

We did a fairly significant amount of background in our tutorial, so I won't belabor this unless the Court has questions. I'll just sort of breeze through these first few up to about slide ten and hit the high points. If the Court has questions, please, of course, interrupt and we'll address them.

We have three patents in the case. I'm on slide three right now of Plaintiff's presentation. There are three patents-in-suit, as the Court knows. They're all the same family and share many common specifications, but there are some differences there.

In general, we cite in this presentation to the '864 just for convenience, the specification. Obviously the claims will come from the patents.

Moving to slide four, just a little bit of background on the inventor. The inventor was very experienced in this industry. This is not a sort of garage invention, as it were. This was developed over — his experience was developed over many years and extensive experience in the development, offering and testing of apps.

Quickly on slide five, the inventor actually wrote and developed code that implemented this invention. In fact,

that was the starting point and the invention grew out of that. It was the conceptual notion. A number of the figures in the patent are actually from the implementation at the time. That's not always true in a patent case, and we thought that was interesting to note.

Moving now to slide six, the leading work that led to these inventions was done in the 2004, 2005 timeframe. As sort of a measuring stick, thinking back, the first Apple iPhone, which didn't launch the conceptive smartphones, per se, but certainly really brought it wide-spread, that was in 2007, Your Honor, so we're a couple of years before then.

Your Honor, it sounded like someone just joined. Maybe we should pause and take roll to see who that is, just for the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Can we ask who just joined the call for purposes of the record?

MS. YOUNG: Yes. Hi. This is Kathryn Young with Micro Focus.

THE COURT: Very good. Thank you. Go ahead and continue.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

In short, what the invention is about, just so we're all on the same page, is when you're developing an application, you want to be able to test it on different devices. You want to be able to test it under different

circumstances of what your network would look like. So on a device that would be processing powers, screen size, memory, so forth, things like that, the power of the resources that are available on the device itself.

And, of course, from the network you're looking at bandwidth, how the phone interacts with the network on a typical basis as it's sending and receiving information, things like that.

And in order to be able to develop an app for multiple different phones and multiple different networks, you used to have to physically test it on all these different things to make sure it worked and to troubleshoot and to improve it and to clear out any bugs, and to make sure that what the app was needing in terms of its resources, both on the device side and the network side, wouldn't exceed those resources.

To do that took a lot of time. It takes awhile to put the app as you're adapting it onto a phone and do that testing and development and then bring it back and so forth.

So Mr. Poulin's idea -- oh, and one thing I should be clear on, Your Honor, is that one of the common tools at the time, Flash, had developed a tool and it had sort of a generic model phone that it could emulate.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Hello? Hello?

THE COURT: Did someone just join the call or did we

That's generally what we're talking about here.

Obviously the specifics are in the claims and that's what we're getting at today.

Slide seven I really just spoke about. There were limitations in how the prior art worked. I think, just in contrast, the advantages of what the invention are that I just mentioned.

Slide eight -- I kind of got ahead of myself, Your
Honor. Slide eight is really what I just mentioned so I'll
pass that by. And the same with slide nine, other than to
note that the third bullet on slide nine really gets to the
heart of this, that the amount of time and money that is
saved -- this can be extremely expensive, and that is more
and more true as the variety of mobile devices has
proliferated over the years. There are more and more
options that consumers have, and therefore, more and more
possibilities for things to go wrong.

And then the fourth bullet also if you have confirmed the app is good on a variety of devices, it's going to launch more quickly. And the launch of a phone -- I'm sorry -- of an app is really important, that initial public feedback, acceptance and growth. If it gets bad reviews from the start, that's going to impede the growth of that app from the very early stage and perhaps its total existence. Given the volume of apps that are available to

people these days, having negative early reviews can be deadly. So avoiding that is very important to app developers.

Again, Your Honor, here we are on slide ten and things I've already spoken about in this brief intro so I'll slide past slide ten.

So now moving to slide 11 and 12, the legal standards, Your Honor, I won't belabor this because I know Your Honor is very familiar with this, but there are a couple of fundamental issues here about what you should go on in terms of this construction effort today.

And if I may -- I'm sure Your Honor is familiar with the quotes on slide 12 and slide 13. I would like to focus, if we can, a little bit on slide 14. And first I want to mention this top quote. Obviously this quote is talking about the importance of intrinsic evidence versus extrinsic, but the very first phrase is actually important here, the clause I mean: When necessary to construe a claim.

There's a dispute that the Defendants have raised here to suggest that simply one party identifying a potential dispute and attempting to have the Court construe the words of a claim, and other parties saying, no, there does not need to be construction, what Defendants are suggesting to the Court and cite cases like Eon and O2 Micro is that somehow that obligates the Court to adopt a construction

that's different than the words of the claims themselves, and that's just not the case. The law doesn't say that. In fact, those two cases themselves don't say that.

I'll just note, since it's in the slides, that Eon, this is Eon LP, it says that the determination that a claim term needs no construction, which is what Wapp is seeking here, or has the plain and ordinary meaning, those types of conclusions by the Court may be inadequate under certain circumstances. Eon goes on to talk about those circumstances.

So it might be inadequate to say the term needs no construction, but it's not automatically inadequate just because one side raises a dispute and the other side says, no, we think the claims are fine as is. O2 Micro said the same thing but even clearer.

And I'm sorry. For the record, the citation is Eon 815 F.3d 1314 at 1318.

And O2 Micro, which Defendants have also cited, says it even more clearly. It says a District Court -- this is a quote: A District Court is not obligated to construe terms with ordinary meanings, end quote.

Then the Court goes on to explain why. There's a policy decision behind it. Again, I'm quoting now: Lest Trial Courts be inundated with requests to parse the meaning of every word in the asserted claims, end quote. And that's

02 Micro, 512 F.3d 1351 at 1360.

And this makes sense. Simply asserting that something needs to be construed does not obligate a Federal Judge to change the words of the claim, and that's what claim construction is. It's substituting words in the claim for other words that the fact finder will then use for a determination of infringement and validity.

The Court instead is readily capable and has the power to simply say this term needs no construction, even though one side says that it should be. So if the Defendants are suggesting otherwise is just wrong.

The second -- that's the first major legal issue here. The second major legal issue is one that comes up a lot, which is how are we going to leave the specification and what does that mean with respect to the claims.

And the case law has quotes, of course, that seem contradictory to one another, and the two in red on slide 14 here are from the same case. The claims should be read in light of the spec is one, and the second is it's a cardinal sin to read the limitations from the spec into the claims.

So how do we resolve that? And when you just look at the overall body of the case law, it becomes clear that the first quote doesn't mean you limit the claim to the specification. It simply means, of course, that the specification reads like what the claims might mean or what

the subject matter is and at least shows what the claims cover because of the examples.

Now I'm going to shift to slide 15 and this is just a simple representation. Your Honor, there are some types of patents where the claims are limited to the written description. Those are the so-called unpredictable arts, which is simply biology, chemistry, pharma, that sort of thing. But in all other types of cases, mechanical, electronic, et cetera, the claims can generally be read broader than the example in the specification, and that's the little diagram we have on slide 15.

If you go to slide 16, this is what happens in these cases when the Defendants look and point to all the examples in the spec and they say aha, here's what all the examples say, and so the claim should be limited. And that happens over and over again. You'll see that argument from Defendants regularly. The specification says that example and that's how the claim should be restricted.

That's not what the law says. The law says the exact opposite. It's a cardinal sin to do that. That's slide 16.

Moving on to slide 17, this is even worse, and this happens a lot here. This is where the focus is on one embodiment, to the exclusion of other disclosed embodiments, so that the claim is read to exclude even things that the patent specification cites or describes as examples, and

that happens here a lot as well.

Why do Defendants do this? Well, maybe they're practicing one of those examples, and so by limiting the claim, that would be an example that got deleted, and so now they have created a sort of safe harbor for themselves. And this happens sometimes, and we see this type of argument here as well and we'll go through that.

Finally, also important is the prosecution history.

Yes, the prosecution history is one of the tools that can legitimately limit the scope of a claim, other than what the words on their face might mean.

There's no such argument here. Not any dispute, as far as we can tell, are the Defendants saying there is a clear and unmistakable disclaimer of subject matter through prosecution. It's a very high bar. As far as we can tell, it's not even being argued here at all.

And that's important, because some of the very common tools that do permit construction of claims, changing the claim language, patentee is his own lexicographer, prosecution history has a clear disclaimer, those are not even being argued here. The Defendant is on tenuous grounds to try to alter the language of the claims in ways that are narrower or exclusive of examples in the embodiments.

Extrinsic evidence. I'm now on slide 19. We see the declaration of Dr. Shoemake and he -- and we'll go into that

in detail, but the bottom line is whatever he is saying when the intrinsic record is clear and doesn't suggest a construction, you can't alter that with extrinsic evidence. That should not be done. That's slide 19.

All right. Your Honor, let me pause there and ask if Your Honor has any questions on any of that or would like some discussion or elucidation?

THE COURT: No, I'm good. Go ahead and continue.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

So moving on to the disputed terms on slide 20, the first is the preamble. That's slide 21.

And, Your Honor, we have a sort of common structure in the slide deck. We -- we just put the claim term -- we show where in the claim it shows up, just for the Court's convenience.

Here there are two related terms in the preamble that are being talked about here: A system for testing an application for a mobile device. That's the heading on slide 22 that we have in the exemplary claim 1 of the '864 patent. And then the similar term on slide 23: A system for developing an application for a mobile device. A system for testing and a system for developing.

Then we have, of course, slides showing both parties' constructions on slide 24. The heading of this, Your Honor, should say system for testing slash developing an

application for a mobile device. The Defendants' proposed construction is the same other than putting in a word evaluation or writing.

Okay. First there's a question about whether the preamble should be limiting here. Your Honor, we really don't have a position on that. Candidly, whether the preamble is limiting or not is not meaningful to us.

What is meaningful to us is if it is limiting, there's no construction necessary. Other than that, it's limiting, that's fine.

But what the Defendants are trying to do is alter the words of that preamble so that they say a lot more than they actually say, and that's what gets into the problems.

Now, for each of these disputes we have a slide similar to slide 25. I'm on slide 25 now, and it just goes through a couple of basic important points, and if you will just keep these in mind in every instance, within the claims themselves the words that are in dispute are not being used in a unique or odd way that would require some construction.

Number two, there's no contention that the patentee has acted as his or her own lexicographer in providing express definition for that term or phrase in the spec. Not happening in this preamble cite.

Lastly, there is no argument at all of any clear and unmistakable disclaimer of subject matter during

prosecution.

So that's where we end up as a starting point for the discussion here. The claims, the spec, the prosecution history all favor leaving the claim language alone. It is what it is. It's clear on its face and there's no reason to change it.

Moving to slide 26, the contrast here are Defendants' proposals, and, Your Honor, I would submit that they suffer from one fundamental issue, which is they're just confusing. The words of the preamble here are very simple and straightforward. They're not confusing. They're easily applicable by anybody.

The Defendants are trying to put in a hodgepodge jumble of aspirational limitations of the claim in the preamble, trying to shovel that in into words that are not needed, and to add that stuff in is just going to make things more confusing, and we can see it in the constructions themselves. The case law says let's not do that. That's slide 26.

Looking at slide 27, there are four issues with the Defendants' proposal, with their construction of the preamble. The first here I'll start to address is this issue of teaching a system that mimics, or the system has to mimic something.

The first point we made, and Your Honor, I'm sure,

knows this, mimic is the proposed construction for the term "emulate" which we're going to talk about later on. The preambles don't even use the word emulate but the Defendants are trying to read that word mimic into even the preamble, so it's really a back door effort to get their emulate construction in. We don't think there's any basis here. That's one.

Talking about mimicking in general, we'll get to a couple of points here, and that is whether this system is restricted entirely to the concept of modeling, emulating, mimicking, whatever you want to call it, as opposed to testing the phone on a real device. And the answer is it's not so limited. The patent contemplates using real-world devices from time to time in the testing, as needed. You don't necessarily have to do it but you can. And so to try to limit the scope of the entire system in a way that might be read to preclude that from happening would be wrong.

Looking at slide 28, we see one example of this, and I'm looking at the upper right-hand clip and the highlighted text there. The interface, the testing interface, may allow an application to be deployed for final testing. So the final testing is part of the process as it's disclosed, if you want to perform that step, and you can do that. The specific claim doesn't necessitate it, it's not required, but certainly it can be included.

Looking at slide 29, if you look at the upper box here first, the upper right-hand text box of the '864 patent at column nine, 60 to 62, here it's talking about this is step 714, and if you look at step 714 in the flowchart on the left-hand side, you can see it's a dotted line. It's an optional step. It may be in some claims, may be in others, may be recited, may be not. But it's an optional step.

And the specification discloses, though, that this is a step that you can do using a real mobile device if you want to. To say that the claim reads out the use of real-world mobile devices if you want to would be wrong. Certainly some elements of the claims are going to require emulation or simulation of certain things. When those elements require it, then that limitation is meaningful, but to limit the entire system to that concept, that's what's wrong with that word mimic.

Slide 33, a summary of what I just said and relevant case law. Slide 31 is similar. The Defendants are looking to read out the embodiments in the examples of the claims and that's improper.

All right. Now, looking at other words that are problematic.

By the way, Your Honor, I was reading Defendants' brief again yesterday and somewhere along the way in their brief they complain that we're picking on individual words of

construction and that we're not really making an argument as to why, we're just complaining about them.

That's kind of wrong for two reasons. First, the presumption is that the claims are going to take on their regular meaning and that they can stand on their own, that they don't need to be construed unless there's a reason to construe it. That's the Defendants' burden to demonstrate why something needs to be construed, not our burden to demonstrate why it does not.

But secondly, in each of these instances where we're taking issue with certain words in the proposed constructions, it's because those words are too limiting or too confusing or some other reason that makes it unadvisable, unnecessary and wrong to substitute that word or phrase for something that is recited in the language of the claims themselves.

This is an example on slide 32 looking at the second topic here. This is just signposting, Your Honor. The evidence here is on slide 33 and 34, that developing an application is more than just writing it. In the construction that Defendants are proposing, if you track the preamble there, it says "developing". They propose to replace that word with "writing". Writing is more narrow than developing. Developing includes lots of different activities, any of which could be encompassed by what this

system does or assists with. And this is slides 33 and 34.

And in the same manner, looking at slide 35, where the preamble says "testing", the Defendants are looking to insert the word "evaluating". But there I say, again, we have issue with the scope.

If we look at slide 36 and 37, we see the other examples of what testing might mean. And I would submit, Your Honor, that the word "evaluating" might lead to confusion. Does that mean an operator is looking at information and analyzing it, evaluating it? I don't know. But that's another reason why inserting that word where it's unnecessary would be problematic. That's slides 36 and 37.

Lastly, we have this issue of real-world mobile device, so this is the tail end of the construction and what needs to be modeled in a sense, and something is modeled.

And we take issue with this in a number of places, this concept of real-world. You just don't need it and it's confusing. In particular, the specification makes clear — looking now at slide 39, and the left-hand box makes clear you can be talking about pre-release mobile devices, scheduled release or current mobile devices.

So, in other words, if you're planning a mobile device or you know that someone is planning a mobile device or have the expectation as an app developer of what the next generation might look like and thinking ahead, hmm, I could

really use that processing power or that side view capability or whatever, I can -- I can look up a set of characteristics that will emulate that or model that and use those in the system so I can start developing apps for future devices.

So is that a real-world device? We don't know. That future device may never materialize. That's why real-world is wrong. It's overly limiting.

And on the right-hand box, still on slide 39, you can -- this spec actually says that in the first highlight: Allowing application development to start before a physical mobile device is available. That's one of the advantages of the invention here, and Defendants are looking to read that out.

Or then they say, well, we're not looking to read that out, Your Honor. We may hear that, well, real-world doesn't mean it can't be in the future. We're in the kind of fight or subsidiary fight that ambiguous claim constructions invite and that's what this would be, at a minimum. We think it's just wrong.

But even Defendants say, no, real-world really means future things that are planned, which would be an odd way to think about real-world. I think you're still inviting confusion and a potential dispute down the line.

Your Honor, that's -- that's all for us on the preamble

unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: No, that sounds good. Thank you. And who will be arguing for the defense? Let me pull up your slides.

MR. REITER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Mark Reiter who will be arguing for the Defendant.

THE COURT: Very good. Go ahead. Thank you.

MR. REITER: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

Well, that was quite a presentation from Mr. Devlin, and I'll do my best to work through all of the issues and cover the many disputes, and I think that is a key -- key noun here is that there are many disputes between the parties and many disputes that require the Court's help in resolving.

Let me start with -- the way that I laid out our presentation is not dissimilar to what Mr. Devlin did. I have a brief summary of the background of the purported invention. I'm not going to go into the legal issues in the same way that Mr. Devlin did. Not going into them doesn't mean that I agree with them. In fact, I disagree with virtually everything he said about the law in the context of what is happening here.

The cases are the cases and the cases say what they say, but the way in which Plaintiff is trying to apply those cases here is entirely wrong.

In fact, Your Honor, just as kind of a predicate to —
to our presentation, I have never, in the 30 years that I've
been doing this, been involved in a case where a party has
refused to take a position on any single claim term. I have
never been involved in a case where a party has said that no
construction is required of every single term that is
raised.

In fact, the Plaintiff didn't raise a single term, which is not surprising, given their positions, did not raise a single term for construction. Everything, according to Plaintiff, either needs no construction or simply should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

But, of course, as Phillips says, as the Federal Circuit has said and as I'm sure Your Honor is very well-aware, the object of this exercise is, absent a -- an example of the inventor acting as his own lexicographer, is to identify -- where there is a dispute, to identify what one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have thought these terms mean. That is the so-called ordinary meaning. That is what Phillips and the Federal Circuit has said over and over again.

And simply punting, simply saying that no construction is necessary for every single term, particularly when there are terms here like "simulate" and "emulate" and "profile display window" that are technical terms that a lay jury

would not understand, to simply say that no construction is necessary I think turns this entire process on its head.

So with that little preface, I will go through very briefly, and we did provide Your Honor with obviously a technical tutorial, but very briefly a summary of what the alleged invention is and the problem that it purported to solve, because I think that's very, very important in understanding what these claims are trying to capture.

So if we look at slide three of our presentation, we start with the provisional application, which is just Mr. Poulin's business plan that he prepared and then filed as a provisional application. It is — it contains a lot of ideas of things to do, with very little explanation of how they are to be done.

But it starts off saying that there are going to be 700 million new handsets in 2005 and developers trying to keep up with apps or programs that could be run on those new handsets as they come out is very, very difficult and there needs to be a way -- the provisional application and also the patents explain there needs to be a way to allow the app developers to keep up with that new introduction of phones.

What the provisional application talks about is it is very difficult right now to do so, because as we see in the bottom — the bottom bullet or pasted excerpt that we have down here is that transferring the application to a new

phone, a physical real-world phone, and trying to test it out takes a lot of time and it's very costly, because you have to go out and buy -- the app developer has to go out and buy the phone.

So what Mr. Poulin appears to have conceived is, well, let's use emulators. Let's -- instead of using real-world devices, let's use emulators, and he points to Flash Lite environment. That's not something that he developed. That's something that came from Macromedia, and he was building on top of that. And if we go over to slide four, we see that concept carried forward to the patent.

And just as Mr. Devlin did, we are going to just cite to the '864 patent, but all of this is found in the other patents as well.

So the '864 patent in the very first column talks about the 700 million new mobile phones expected to be released in 2005 and the — the difficulty that app developers have in keeping up with new programs that would run on these devices, and the patent explains that transferring the application to the device and playing it is really the only way that the developer can decide or can determine whether his or her new program can work. And again, Mr. Poulin explains that is very time-consuming and very costly.

So what does he do? What is the solution? We see on page five the solution. The solution is we're not going to

use real-world devices. We're going to use emulators, and the patent is very, very specific and goes on for column after column about what these emulators might do and how precise they need to be.

We have Table 1. We have Fig. 2, as we see on slide five, about how the emulator generates a mobile device model. So it looks like, acts like, smells like virtually the actual device, but it allows, according to the patent, the developer to work more quickly and not have to go and buy each device and can that way test his or her application as it's being developed.

Mr. Poulin, as we see on slide six and this also comes out of the patent, says you can get these emulators. He's not purporting to have invented emulators or doesn't explain how to build the emulators. He says you can buy them. You can subscribe to them for a fee of ten to \$15 per handset, which saves a lot of money, a hundred to \$200 per mobile device. So he's explaining again, let's use these emulators. It will speed things up. It will be less expensive.

And he also says, as we go to slide seven, we want to see how that application, the application under development is going to operate on the mobile device, and the mobile device has a certain amount of resources. And we saw -- and we'll go over this in more detail as I get into the preamble

term, but we see back on slide five that the mobile device has characteristics. It has a processor, processor speed and memory size and storage size, and it even describes how big the screen on the actual device would be.

And so back on slide seven, the patent explains that you need to have a -- a display that shows what resources are available of the device, and that's that red line, and we'll refer to that as we go throughout the presentation today as the cap out line or the capacity line.

And the application as it's running and those bars that we see in Fig. 3 are different time sequences of the application running. If a bar goes above that red line, then we know that the resources available to the application of the mobile device are too limited and the mobile device is likely going to crash.

And the other thing that the patents describe is that these mobile devices, because they are mobile devices, are not just working in isolation. They operate on a network, and operating on a network also consumes resources of the mobile device. We see this on slides eight and nine.

So what the invention talks about, what the patents describe is accounting for those resources consumed of the mobile device by the network. So if a phone call comes in, if a message, a text message comes in, that will consume memory. It consumes processing power. And as we go from

slide eight to nine, we see that red line goes down because the network -- the interaction between the mobile device and the network takes up processing power, memory power, and so the resources available to the application are limited.

And that's really what this purported invention is about, is taking a virtual version of the mobile device, an emulator device, testing the application on that device, having a display which shows exactly how that app -- that program under development is running in comparison to the available resources of the mobile device, and then also including in the mix the network -- the network consumption of the resources of the mobile device.

So taking all that into account, then the app developer can see if his or her app is going to work on that phone or if it's going to cause the phone to crash. So that's the background, and I think that background is very, very important as we get into each of these terms and each of — particularly the preamble, because that is what Mr. Poulin purported to have invented, this emulated system or this system that uses an emulator to develop these apps.

And it doesn't mean that you can't -- that a developer can't go off and test the device on a physical device as a final test, but what his invention is about, and it's very, very clear from the provisional application, from the background of each of the patents, that using real devices

and only using real devices doesn't work. It's too time-consuming and it's too expensive. So you have to use the emulator devices.

Now, Mr. Devlin talked about 02 Micro, and our reliance on 02 Micro is demanding, respectfully, that this Court resolve these disputes. 02 Micro does say that that is not an excuse for a party or parties to ask the Court to resolve the construction of every single term in the patents, and I don't think that is at all the case here.

We see on slide ten the six terms grouped together that are at issue here. We're not — out of three patents and I think there are 150 total terms, of course, not all asserted here, but having six terms is very, very far from what 02 Micro talks about in the context of over-populating the construction analysis.

We have been very diligent in identifying the terms that there are a dispute for and which absolutely require construction and resolution of that dispute.

So if we go to slide 11, and that is again 02 Micro: Where the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of the claim term, it is the Court's duty to resolve it. And we do have a fundamental dispute with respect to each of these six terms as to what they mean and how they should be applied with respect to these patents.

Most particularly -- not most particularly, but

focusing now on just the first limitation, the preamble, it's very, very clear that we have a dispute over scope that needs to be resolved. And just simply saying no construction necessary really I think turns O2 Micro and this process on its head.

I've already talked very briefly, on slide 12, words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. We see Phillips cite to the Innova case in this slide. The Court construing a patent seeks to accord a claim the meaning it would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.

And that's exactly what we have attempted to do here,
Your Honor, and we believe we have done. And we believe
that Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are just simply punting.
They want to wait, keep their powder dry, and hope that they
can keep these claims as amorphous as possible, through the
expert discovery phase and possibly trial.

So skipping on to now slide 15, we get to the preamble term, and I'll pause for just a second and see if Your Honor has any questions about what the alleged invention is or anything that I described there.

THE COURT: No, I'm good with that, but let me ask or make a general statement. Although Plaintiff hasn't really wanted to take a position on whether the preambles are limiting, the way I look at it, they are limiting, but I don't

see a problem with giving them plain and ordinary meaning.

I say that as you discuss your slides and your presentation on this, of why someone skilled in the art would not understand the limitations of the preamble, without having to import other words that you put into it like mimic or real-world mobile.

And so I just make that statement as you go through your presentation, because the Court's view is the Court finds or is probably going to have to find that these are limiting, but I don't see why I can't give it its plain and ordinary meaning and that someone skilled in the art wouldn't understand that.

MR. REITER: Understood, and thank you for that clarification, Your Honor.

I think the way that Your Honor put it is really the crux of what the dispute is, is what would one of ordinary skill in the art understand these terms to mean, based on what the alleged invention is and what the patents disclose. I think that a jury looking at this, a lay fact jury would not understand what it means to be just a system for testing, for example, an application for a mobile device.

I think it is absolutely critical to this invention, to the extent that there is an invention, that that -- that claim, it be clear to the jury that it requires the use of an emulated device.

Now, if Your Honor wants to provide that or thinks it better to provide that someplace else and we can talk about where that might be, that's fine. But that is why I think I'm -- and I feel good that the Court understands that these limitations are limiting, and so I'll skip to slide 18 which kind of I think underscores that.

We see in Pitney Bowes that if the preamble is necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim. So it's talking about a construction, and we see on that slide, slide 18, that a system for testing can't just be, in the abstract, a system for testing.

In patents and the provision I'll talk about, testing on physical devices was known in the art. The patents disparage that approach and the patent's purported solution was to use an emulated device. Otherwise, without that limitation, without that understanding, all that's left of the body of the claim is really just software that does something, and it is software that includes a display window and simulates a network while a mobile device executes an application.

Absent the preamble and understanding exactly what that preamble means and construing it consistent with the way one of skill in the art would understand it leaves the body of

the claim without any structure, without anything to complete it.

And so we need to have the concept of the testing system being done on an emulated device, and we see that's all very consistent with what the abstract says on slide 19. The mobile device is emulated in real time, and we see the mobile device is emulated in every single abstract.

And we see, for example, on the '192 patent and on the '678 patent that the model is based on characteristics indicative of performance of the mobile device. It is talking about the emulated version of the mobile device, not the real version of the mobile device.

We see on slide 20 that the patents talk about in all embodiments it is to be noted that emulation is performed. It's performed on a processor extrinsic to the mobile device that's being emulated when testing is not done on the actual device itself.

Looking again at slide 21, we've already seen this concept that two of the most adverse variables for the Flash Lite developer are trying to load the device or the application into the real device, the time and expense associated with that.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask this.

MR. REITER: Sure.

THE COURT: In terms of the preambles here, they

don't refer to simulating, emulating or your use of the word mimicking, so why should the Court impose that on the preamble, especially --

MR. REITER: Well, first --

THE COURT: Let me just finish, because -- and add something else. Especially considering mimic doesn't appear anywhere else in either the claims or the specification, but simulate and emulate appear in other disputed terms presented by the parties. So why should such limitations be imposed like a generic term system when you look at -- I'm just trying to see. You're trying to add those into the preamble, further limitations, and that's what I'm trying to understand is why should the Court do that?

MR. REITER: Okay. I understand Your Honor's question. So there's two concepts that I think need to be understood here, and we're going to be getting into these later but maybe it makes sense to skip ahead.

The concepts of simulation and emulation in these patents are two entirely different concepts, two entirely different concepts. The patents refer to simulation when they refer to the network and simulating the network, very, very consistent. And I have slides and maybe Your Honor has seen those over the weekend that explain and show how the patents consistently and exclusively refer to simulation of the network, not simulation of the mobile device. With

respect to emulation, the patents only refer to the mobile device as being emulated. Two very different concepts.

Consistent with that, these claims, with the one exception of the '192 patent in claim 1, and we think that was a drafting error in prosecution, but very consistent with that, the claims do not ever refer to emulation of the mobile device.

If you look at claim 1 of the '678 patent, it only talks about simulating the network. Claim 1 of the '864 patent only talks about simulating the network. Claim 1 of the '192 patent does talk about emulating the network, but that's not right. That is an error in prosecution and I'm going to go through that. And if the Court construes that or keeps that word "emulate" there, that patent — that claim is invalid for lack of support in the written description.

So to understand the difference between emulate and simulate, one referring to the network and one referring to the mobile device, then one realizes that this system for testing, for developing, which is in the preamble, a application for a mobile device has to be done on an emulated device.

That is the hook. Renishaw talks about having a hook.

That is the hook for making sure that what the inventor purportedly invented, a system for testing using an emulated

device and requiring an emulated device, is included within the scope of the claim.

And let me pause there and see if I've answered Your Honor's question, at least in part.

THE COURT: No, go ahead. Thank you.

MR. REITER: Okay. So going back to the slides, I think there is an agreement between the parties if we go to -- and what we heard from Mr. Devlin today about the background of the invention was very different from what we saw in their tutorial.

If we look at slide 23, they agree that the disadvantage in the prior art where it's using actual phones is because it was extremely slow, and so what we had to do was go to the emulated device.

And I mentioned a moment ago, and this kind of dovetails with Your Honor's question of just a second ago, that perhaps there's another place in the claim to — to capture that concept of emulation, and I think that's in what we see on slide 24 where I have the '864, the '192 and the '678 first claims where it talks about indicative of performance of the mobile device.

If you remember, if we go back to the abstracts, the abstracts talk about the model, which is the emulated device, is based on characteristics indicative of performance of the mobile device. It's not using the actual

device. If it were using the actual device, it wouldn't say indicative of. It would say equivalent to or some other characterization.

But here the claims are trying to capture that emulation aspect, and that's carried out -- carried forward or from the preamble where you have the antecedent basis for mobile device. The mobile device is in the preamble and it talks about the preamble in the body of the claim, and that mobile device has to be an emulated device.

As I said, it is very clear as we go through every single embodiment of the claims, and we cited, Your Honor, at page eight of our brief In Re: Abbott Diabetes, 696 F.3d 1142. In that case the Federal Circuit talks about the primary purpose of the invention was to provide, in that case, a small compact device that operates a sensor and so forth. And it goes on to say: Every embodiment disclosed in the specification shows a sensor without cables or wires. And it said that the patentee repeatedly, consistently and exclusively depicted a sensor without wires, while simultaneously disparaging sensors with wires.

That's exactly the situation we have here. The primary purpose of Mr. Poulin's invention was to avoid using physical devices. Every embodiment disclosed in the patent uses an emulated mobile device and the patent disparages the use of physical devices. We see on slide 25, slide 26, and

summarized on slide 27 how every embodiment teaches the use of an emulator.

And, again, from Wapp's tutorial, on slide 28, the patents are directed — this is their words, not mine. The patents are directed to systems and methods for developing and testing mobile applications or mobile apps. They do this by emulating mobile devices without loading up the app onto an actual phone. That is the crux of this alleged invention. Without it, there is nothing.

You see they double down on this on slide 29. The invention overview, the model emulates the mobile device.

So the preambles are limiting. I understand the Court already recognizes that, and the preambles are limiting because they provide that context for the rest of the body of the claim, and they can only do that if the concept of that emulated device is attributed to the preamble.

Mr. Devlin talked about -- we will turn to slide 31 -that we are reading out limitations or embodiments. That is
entirely false. Yes, the patent does say that as a final
test -- this is in column six. That as a final test, the
developer may, and it's permissive, may, test the device in
a final way on a physical device, but that's after all of
the testing is done on the emulated devices.

And we see this and I think Mr. Devlin referred to these figures in his presentation but certainly in his

briefing. Fig. 7, which we see on slide 32 of my presentation, shows the application claim within an emulated mobile device at 704, and then you transfer the application to the mobile device.

Well, if we look at what the patent actually talks about, it's publishing the application to the mobile device. Not testing it. The testing is done. The testing is done at that point.

The same thing on Fig. 13. It talks about loading the simulator interface into the mobile device model. The emulator loads the network simulator. There is nothing about testing in Fig. 13. Nothing about testing on the physical device.

And going on to slide 34, again, yes, the patent says that the developer may transfer the application to a physical device for final testing, but that's permissive. Certainly our construction, our construction of the preamble doesn't take that away, doesn't preclude that, and we see this in all types of situations and technologies.

As we see on slide 34 with the picture of the car, Ford doesn't crash car after car after car to see how it's going to work. It models it first and then it does a final testing on a real car. And that's exactly what's described in column six, lines 31 to 33.

Again, our construction doesn't preclude the final

testing on a mobile device, an actual mobile device. It requires, on the other hand, that the testing include the emulated device. Absent that, there is no invention here, Your Honor. There is no invention.

And finally, Wapp's nitpicking about the use of testing versus evaluating or developing versus writing I think is just that, just nitpicking.

They haven't provided any construction. They haven't provided any alternative. They've said that we are reading things out, but that's not at all true.

Mr. Devlin's slide 33 shows various elements of the patent, the emulation and testing and so forth. That's the entirety of what's going on.

What we're saying, Your Honor, and what we think is absolutely critical, again, is that in order for this claim, for the body of this claim to have structure, for there to be any meaning to the body of this claim, it has to be focused on an emulated — the use of an emulated device as opposed to a real-world device, and there is absolutely no dispute here.

We did meet and confer with Plaintiffs for the 4-5 submission that we submitted a few weeks ago, or a week or so ago. We asked -- we thought we were close based on the tutorial that, okay, we agree that emulated devices need to be used here, and they said, no, we don't. We think you can

use a physical device without an emulated device.

So there is absolutely a dispute between the parties.

This is not some hypothetical dispute that Mr. Devlin was alluding to in O2 Micro. There is a real dispute here and a real dispute that requires the Court's assistance.

And I'll stop there, Your Honor, and see if there are any other questions.

THE COURT: Let me ask one question on something you briefly mentioned. The issue of in the '192 patent you want to -- your construction there puts the word "writing". Where do you find support limiting "developing" to "writing"?

MR. REITER: A fair question, of course. We felt like that was conceptually what was being described in that claim, given the background of the patent, given what we see in the -- I'm sorry, turning back to slide -- slide four. With the rapid development it requires that applications be designed to run on these systems. Development systems targeted may become obsolete. The only way to determine if an application plays.

So looking at column one over to column two, focusing on the '864 patent again, we believe that it was talking about the app developer writing these applications, these programs for these -- these devices.

If the Court doesn't believe that writing is the right word or gerund, that's fine. What we were trying to do is

trying to avoid defining the term with a term.

I don't think we really have a problem with keeping the word "developing" there. The concept here that I believe is really critical, as I've said over and over again, and I apologize for sounding like a broken record on this but I feel very strongly about it, is the idea of the use of emulated devices as opposed to real-world devices.

So, again, we were trying not to be tautological in defining the term with a term. If the Court thinks that word should stay, that's not an issue for us. The bigger issue, again, is making it clear to the jury that this system has to use an emulated device, and it's a system that is developing applications that are going to be used on mobile devices as opposed to just generically applications that might be used on a computer or elsewhere.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Would you like to give a short response and then go on to the next term?

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes. This is Tim Devlin again.

Just briefly, first just from a legal point and then the specifics on preamble. The argument that I'm hearing again is that somehow because the Defendants have asserted that something needs to be construed, then we, as the Plaintiff, must propose our own set of alternate words for the claim language and then the Court must select from the

alternate set of words to supplant what is actually recited in the claim itself, and that's just not the case.

The follow-on argument is, of course, that we, the Plaintiff here, have no sort of entrant in the contest, as it were, we've ceded the field, and so the Defendants win by default. That is absolutely wrong.

Sometimes the best words to connote what the claim means are the words that are used in the claim, and that's what we have here in every one of these instances.

I don't always, as a matter of course, Your Honor, just say no construction. Sometimes I think something needs to be construed and we offer a construction. We do that in many cases.

But here for every term the clearest language is what is in the claim itself already. That's what should be adopted. That's why we're saying no construction is necessary.

On the specifics of the preamble, a couple things.

And, Your Honor, I'm going to set aside all of the -- unless

Your Honor is interested, I'm going to set aside for now the

detour into emulate and simulate itself and just focus on

the preamble here.

And one of the problems is that the Defendants are not actually offering a plain and ordinary meaning here. Over and over again what we're hearing is it says this in the

spec, it says this in the provisional, says it in the spec, so we have to have it in here. That's reading in a limitation from the specification.

If you look at the actual language of each of these preambles, a system for testing an application for a mobile device, it's plain as day. It does not need to be construed. Its plain and ordinary meaning is best expressed by those words itself.

That's not what the Defendants are trying to do here.

And simply because they're trying to push stuff into this preamble that shouldn't be there doesn't mean that we have to propose alternate language or that the Court has to adopt some alternate language. That's not how the law works. So that specifically is on the preamble.

And talking more specifically here, the Defendant is sort of acting as if the rest of the claim language doesn't exist. The claims define the scope, and sometimes these claims use the word emulate, in which case that will be required, and sometimes they don't.

A simple example is claim 1 of the '864 patent. It talks about simulating a variety of network characteristics but nothing in that claim involves emulating. It does not recite emulating anything in the claim. That word does not appear in any form, emulate, emulated, at all.

What the Defendant is saying is, well, that's required

because of what the spec is saying. That's not the case.

And they say we're not reading out any embodiment because
the spec is loading it up at the end. That's not the case.

If we go back, Your Honor, if we may, to our slide, Wapp's slide 29 and 28, the embodiment is described in the specification itself. Looking at the top quote, it's talking about step 714, which is testing the network, which is optional, but it is recited in some of these claims, like claim 1 that we just talked about, and it cites to the testing application, for example, application 104, which is the reference we'll use, running on a mobile device, that is a mobile phone. Right there, when it says mobile device, this says e.g. mobile device 114. What is that? If you go back up to slide 28 and see Fig. 1A, you see mobile device 114 is the actual device.

So the claims that don't cite emulate but recite simulate the network environment could include potentially the use of a real-world phone. That's what the Defendant is leaving out. That's the embodiment that was read out by inserting in the preamble a requirement of mimicking, which is the word for emulate. And applying that to the preamble throughout the whole set of claims, even if some of those claims don't actually recite emulate, that's a problem. That's not plain and ordinary meaning. That's reading one embodiment in the claim to the exclusion of others.

And plus, I'll say, Your Honor, the word nitpicking, that changing a word from developing to writing is nitpicking. Your Honor, there are only two steps in this whole endeavor in the long run, interpreting the claims and then applying those interpreted claims to see if there's infringement and validity. And if in interpreting claims we're going to change words, particularly words that are now (unintelligible), that's a problem. It's going to impact things tremendously.

And none of this is nitpicking. All of this is critical. Every word matters. That's why generally, unless there's a reason to change the words, don't construe them.

Okay. Any questions there, Your Honor? And I'll move on to the next step.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.

MR. REITER: Your Honor, can I -- I'm sorry. This is Mr. Reiter. Can I interrupt for just one second and make one very quick response?

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. REITER: Thank you. First, I hear Mr. Devlin saying that we don't need emulated devices. I think that turns this patent, this invention to the extent there is one, on its head. It's entirely contrary to what the patent discloses and to what the inventor said he is trying to — the problem he is trying to solve. So that's point number one.

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Point number two, finally, is with respect to Fig. 7 and that step 714, all that is saying is that, yes, a real device run on a system, but that is not talking about testing the application on that real device. It is just talking about a real device running on a network. That's all that 714 is.
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And we say, as I already explained, at step 716, once the testing is done, then it is published to the mobile device. There's no testing on a mobile device in Fig. 7.

Thank you, Your Honor, for that indulgence.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Devlin, go ahead.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Moving on to application -- Your Honor, I won't address that unless the Court has guestions. I'll move on.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DEVLIN: Hearing nothing, thank you, Your Honor.

The next word is "application". Slide 41 shows it within the context of the claims and then slide 42 just has the Defendants' proposed construction and Wapp's proposal as well, again, no construction.

And, Your Honor, this one, I would suggest, is a really good example of where adding words is just going to confuse the issue. It's going to create confusion where none exists.

We all know what an app is now. I don't think there's

going to be a lot of confusion in anyone's mind what an app is, and we're going to apply this claim accordingly and go forth. That's it. It's a very simple term. It's well-understood from a technological standpoint these days and from a lay person standpoint. No juror will be confused by the use of this word.

Moving on to slide 43, again, these same three bullets are true. The term is used in the claims in its normal meaning. There's nothing special about it that would require some interpretation. There's no express definition in the specification and there's no argument that there's any disclaimer from prosecution. All of the normal claim construction tools say, leave it alone, it's fine.

Moving to slide 44, we want to talk about some of the issues now with what Defendants do. The first one is using the term "program" as a substitute for "application", and going on to slide 45, I don't think there's a dispute that an app is some sort of program, but there's two problems with it though using that word "program".

One is the specification happens to use program when talking about the broader system, as opposed to the app that is under development and testing and so forth. So to the extent someone is looking at the spec and a juror picks up an exhibit in the jury room or whatever, there is some potential for confusion by using that word in place of

application.

The other problem -- and here I happen to be on slide 45, Your Honor, but in slide 45 it's going to go through showing clearly how what's referred to as the app is the component that's being tested or developed, not the broader system, and that is what is referenced as program now in the specification, and we have citations to that in our brief.

The other problem that exists is using the word program, you realize that an app is a program but a program is not necessarily an app. And, Your Honor, I'm being a little colloquial here to say that, but what I can say is that the world of a program can include things that are not apps. So once you insert the word program and begin your construction by replacing the word app with that word, you're now obligated to follow through and provide additional words that define the word program into the things we're talking about here, which is apps. So you specifically have to go down this path of using additional words that then create additional problems, and that's what's happening here.

So slide 47 talks about these problems in their proposed construction, that it is designed to run on a mobile device, whatever that means. Does it mean the software was originally designed to run on a desktop computer but is now accessible to be run in what looks like

an app on a mobile phone? That now that is excluded from the claims? That doesn't seem right, especially as we go on and on in time and mobile phones become more powerful. I don't think that word "designed to run" is going to be particularly useful.

Of course, if you look at slide 48, there's many different ways that the specification talks about how an app might be utilized within a system: Played on, published to, running within, whatever, without having to get into the intent of its design, which is just going to invite some confusion and potential dispute down the line.

Lastly, starting on slide 49, back to our signposts, the problem here that Defendants' construction -- and, again, they're forced to do this. By starting with a broad term and then trying to delineate it, they're forced to make a problem with the construction and here it's that it renders other claim language superfluous.

If you look at slide 50, we can see that. The construction proposed by Defendants is on the left-hand side of slide 50, and the right-hand side is the typical claims where the term appears.

In the preamble, if you insert the words "program designed to run on a mobile device" for the word "application", you get something that reads "for testing an application designed to run on a mobile device or a mobile

device".

If we go to slide 51, as Your Honor is aware, interpretations that render other claim terms superfluous are disfavored because they're duplicative, because they don't take into account the whole structure of the claim language, and that invites confusion.

Your Honor, that's all we have on that, if Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: No, that's fine. Thank you. Then let me ask defense just a general question. Why would the word "program" be any clearer or more accurate than using the term "application"? Because wouldn't someone skilled in the art understand what application means?

MR. REITER: I -- Your Honor, Mark Reiter for the Defendants again.

I'm not sure that that's true. So if we look at slide 38 of our presentation, these are dictionary definitions that Wapp proposed with its opening brief. These are not our definitions or our dictionaries, but this is the extrinsic evidence that Wapp proposed.

We see that an application can be pretty much anything, and in fact, Wapp's own dictionary, the Microsoft Dictionary we see at the bottom of the page, talks about a program designed to. That's exactly what our construction describes. It is a program designed to run on a mobile

device.

And that is also consistent, Your Honor, with slide 40 where it says in the background again, this rapid mobile device development requires that applications designed to run on these mobile devices. So we use the word "program" because it is consistent with what one of ordinary skill in the art would understand an application to be, that is, a computer program, but it's a computer program in this context designed for a particular use, that is, for a particular technology, that is, one designed to run on a mobile device.

That's consistent with Wapp's dictionaries, that's consistent with what the specification says, and that's how one of ordinary skill in the art, we believe, reading this patent would have understood the word "application".

And Mr. Devlin talks about everybody understands what an app is, but I haven't heard him say what it is.

Everybody understands what it is. I heard him say that multiple times, but he never said what it is.

We have provided for the Court, for the jury, a construction that is clear, that is true to the context of the claims and the specifications, and would help the jury understand what exactly the limits of this patent is and are.

And I think I went beyond Your Honor's question. I'm

sorry.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask, based on that answer, are you contending that "application" has some special meaning in these patents-in-suit? And if so, where's the intrinsic evidence to support that?

MR. REITER: I -- yes, I think we are saying that it has not necessarily a special meaning, but it is a restricted meaning. It's a limited meaning. In fact, Wapp in its reply brief agrees that it is a limited meaning.

If Your Honor will bear with me, on page four of their reply, they say the language of the claims establishes the opposite. Indeed, because the surrounding claim language shows that the quote/unquote application is more specific than its normal use.

And that's exactly what our construction is intended to capture is that the patents here, just as Wapp itself has explained to Your Honor, the use here is more restrictive than just the broad use that one might find in these dictionaries that we just looked at.

And the specification and the background, now to answer Your Honor's question, is all very, very clear. We start with the claim and the claim talks about, as we see on slide 39, that the mobile device is executing the application. We see on slide 40 again, and I mentioned this briefly, that because of the rapid development, it requires the

applications designed to run on these mobile devices. Also on slide 40, transfer the application to the device.

Going on to -- I think I lost my page -- slide 41, the abstracts executing in real time in a mobile device. This is the application playing on a mobile device.

Slide 42 from Figs. 6 and 7, load the application into the model, into the model, the emulated version of the mobile device. These are programs that are specific.

And we see this same language I was talking about a moment ago on the next slide, I believe slide 43, because the surrounding claim language shows the application is more specific than its normal use.

We haven't heard a definition from Wapp, from the Plaintiff, that explains what that more specific definition is, more specific use is. Our construction captures that.

Their tutorial is consistent, that it's testing mobile applications or mobile apps. We see on the right side of the next slide where — of the same slide, the model emulates the mobile device and can play the application and show what would be displayed. So the mobile device is playing the application. It's not just a generic application. It is something specific to the mobile device.

And the last slide that we have, this is slide 45 of this part of the presentation, is we believe that program accurately captures what this is. It is a computer program.

It's a computer program that has a specific purpose and context. Its context is that of mobile devices.

And with respect to run versus play, we're not wedded to run. We're not wedded to play. They both -- both of those verbs appear in the specification. And I think I showed you on column one in our slide 40 how it talks about applications designed to run on these devices.

Then finally, with respect to the redundancy, I'm not really sure that there is any redundancy here. But if there is, then our construction of the preamble, which takes all of this into account, that identifies the emulated device and that says that it is an emulated mobile device that is testing an application designed to be run on a mobile device.

So the specification very, very clearly supports the concept that this application is not just a generic application that could be used in any context. Wapp agrees with that, as we've seen in their reply brief, and our construction captures that.

THE COURT: Let me ask, so if the Court finds that the preambles are limiting, isn't your proposed construction, run a mobile device, isn't that redundant? I mean, how is that not?

MR. REITER: I don't think that it is, Your Honor, because, as I've said -- and maybe I'm hoping too

optimistically. I'm hoping that the Court -- at least that I was clear in what I explained before, that our construction of the preamble, of the entire preamble, takes out any redundancy that was there, but I don't think, even without that, that there would be redundancy.

It is a program designed to run on a mobile device or a mobile device. It's a system for testing an application.

What is that application? It's a program designed to run on a mobile device and it's a system for testing a mobile device.

So the application provides context. The application has to be one -- a program that runs on the mobile device. I think that's very clear.

I don't hear — although it appears that they're saying that if that redundancy is there, then it's clear that the application has to be limited to that mobile device, but I don't hear Wapp taking any position at all.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Then one other thing is you just indicated you're not wedded to either run or to play. So you're not arguing there's anything special about how the application operates, are you?

MR. REITER: No, Your Honor. As I said, the word play, the word run, the word execute, all of that appears in the specifications. We felt like run was a very clear and understandable way of describing this. Play is fine as well.

The context of it is what's critical, the context in which this program — the context in which this program is designed, and that context is for a mobile device, not just generically a computer or a server or something else. It's for a mobile device.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I guess we'll go ahead and go on to the next term.

Mr. Devlin, I don't know if you want to respond to anything. I have a general question I want to ask before we start on simulate and emulate, but I didn't know if you had a response to say before we begin that.

MR. DEVLIN: Just very briefly, Your Honor, thank you, and then I'll pause and we'll deal with your question on emulate and simulate.

Right at the end the Defendants' counsel indicated that the big issue is saying that an app is something that is on a mobile device, but the claims already say that. There's no need to keep saying that again. The preambles say an application for a mobile device, and so it's unnecessary entirely to try to say something more to make that point, because it's already made in other claim language. That's the redundancy issue.

Now, what Defendants are saying on redundancy, Your Honor, is they have construction of the preamble that really accounts for the whole preamble, including the word

application already, and so you would kind of -- when you use that construction, you sort of sweep away the redundancy issue is I think what they're getting at.

The problem is it assumes that the Court adopts the Defendants' proposed construction for the preamble, as opposed to what the Court's concern I think is, which is the Court finds it to be limiting, but then it doesn't need to be construed. It's clear on its face. And once you do that, now you have a problem with that. The redundancy is an issue, and so I think that's just to clean that up.

That's really all I wanted to say there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So as to simulate and emulate, just a general proposition is why shouldn't we presume that these different terms have different meanings in the patents, since they were used differently, versus you want to say we can use them interchangeably? So as you craft your presentation on this, that's my general overarching question.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. And I don't know if we actually ever said it that way, but if that came across or certainly if we did say something that way, that they're interchangeable, that's not what we intended, so I appreciate Your Honor raising that and I'll try to address that as I go through the points here in the presentation.

One thing to note at the outset, Your Honor, is that when you sort of think about what does this claim mean, it's

a little confusing. How do we deal with what emulate implies in this claim? Looking at the claim language as a whole, both emulate and simulate, each case carries forward or preludes to additional claim language. So you can't — there's no need to pluck this term out of thin air and look at it in isolation and say what does that mean, because in each case, the claim kind of tells us as part of a broader phrase what the claim requires.

For example, I'm looking now at claim 20 of the '864 patent. And if Your Honor wants to take a moment -- I don't have it on my slides, it occurred to me as I was hearing the argument today, so I flagged it here. I can read it or if Your Honor --

THE COURT: No, that's fine. I have those in front of me, all three of them, so that's fine. I have them in front of me.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. So looking at the '864 patent, claim 20, when we see the word emulate, it's not just there by itself, emulating. It's emulating each of the mobile devices in real time using respective model running on a processor extrinsic to the mobile device. In other words, in this claim right here, it's not running on the mobile device itself. Instead, the emulating involves in real time using respective models of a device. The claim informs claim it's talking about when it's talking about emulate.

It generally does the same thing with simulate. It's talking about simulating network characteristics.

In the context of the claims, we don't think those things are unclear in any way. We think they're fairly straightforward.

I think the Defendants raise a good point or a reasonable point in that in most cases the patentee sort of utilized the word emulate when talking about the -- what happens with the app on a mobile device, sort of emulating that process, and generally used simulate to talk about the broader environment, like network characteristics and so forth.

But each claim on its own reads as it does, and in the context of each claim, these words, what they mean are clear. So I think they may have used two words, Your Honor, in order to delineate, because some claims have emulating something and simulating something else. So by using two different words, you can keep track of what's going on with more clarity. That's the point, before we get into the details here.

Looking at slide 53, that's just where the words appear in the claims. Slide 54 outlines the parties' constructions.

Slide 55 is our typical recitation or reconciliation that what is happening here is not one of the normal needed

rationales for claim construction. Nothing in the claims causes these things to be used unusually. They give context to it. There's nothing unusual about it that requires a different meaning to these words than they normally have.

The specification doesn't provide any express definition, certainly not the express definition -- certainly not the definition Defendants propose here.

No prosecution history estoppel.

Then there's a fourth one here, which is that their own expert concedes that these words are not used in any special way in these patents. And if you go to slide 56, we'll deal with that one first.

And I won't bother to read these, Your Honor, but if you read the highlighted portions, one with respect to emulate, one with respect to simulate, and the expert saying, yeah, there's no special meaning here. Plain and ordinary meaning as understood is fine. So there's really no need to inject anything new for that reason.

All right. Slide 57, Your Honor, these are the problems with Defendants' construction. They fall really into two separate categories. One relates to intrinsic record and the other relates to the extrinsic record.

First, intrinsic record, and we're at slide 58. And I apologize for being a little snarky here, Your Honor. I think I would redo this slide if I could. But the reality

is that there is no usage of Defendants' proposed terms in the intrinsic record. The Defendants, looking at the world outside the intrinsic record, entire world and saying to themselves, hmm, we're going to pick a couple of words, let's do that.

And one thing that's in their briefing, Your Honor, that I don't know if it's in the slides is that the Defendants' expert was not involved in the selection of those words. They were selected by the Defendants or their counsel, and they were presented to the expert and he agreed with them. But they're not from the intrinsic record.

In fact, if we look at slide 59 and I'll sort of -yes, let me stop at 59. The specification uses the word
"emulate" regularly obviously, and "simulate" regularly.

And so the specification, to the extent that these words
need some sort of conveyance, the specification just uses
these words. These are the natural words that are being
used and the words are clear from the context of the claim.

Not the Defendants' proposals. They do not come from the
intrinsic record.

Slide 60 shows one of the problems with using a word that doesn't appear anywhere from the intrinsic record, and that's that if you look at the patents themselves and see what happens, the application is run — the application itself is run, not mimicked. It's emulated as being run on

a target mobile device, and that's what's modeled is this target mobile device characteristics. The application does not mimic, and their construction confuses these issues.

And I'm going on to slide 61 and this is where, speaking of confusion, Your Honor, the problem -- you know, any effort at claim construction should at least keep things less confusing, not more confusing. But injecting these words as substitutes, that is "mimic" and "imitate" as substitutes for "emulate" and "simulate" is just a recipe for confusion.

The central argument here — and I want to talk for a minute on slide 62. The central argument that's being offered up here is that emulate is more precise and simulate is less precise. Your Honor, I'm not sure that's truly the case. There's nothing, I don't think, in the specification or intrinsic record that supports that. We see in the extrinsic evidence there's really nothing to support that either, because of the cross-pollinization of these various words and the definitions for each one.

But there is something going on here behind the scenes, and that is Defendants trying to load onto the word emulate some degree of precision that the claims themselves don't require.

And in their briefing -- I'll give you one example,
Your Honor, from the briefing, and that is on I think page

17 of Defendants' brief. I may be wrong but I'll check that citation, Your Honor.

But they point to Table 1 of the patent, which is a table of exemplary characteristics of a phone and they contrast that with where simulate is used and the breadth and lack of specificity in the details of the network environment. So saying it's much more specific looking at how it's used in the patent.

In the patent, Table 1 is expressly identified as exemplary, those sets of characteristics. So this concept of precision is trying to read in an example in the preferred embodiment.

The specific citation, Your Honor, is in the '864 patent, column five, starting at line 36. The patent says Table 1, mobile device characteristics shows exemplary characteristics that may be used to specify hardware attributes.

If you follow down in the text onto column six, about two paragraphs later, at the end of the paragraph that begins on column six around line six or so, patent expressly says as appreciated, additional or fewer characteristics may be included. And so the patent itself talks about how you can use fewer characteristics. You might only use one or two. Who knows? The claims aren't limited to any particular number.

But the patent definitely says you don't have to be as specific as this table, but that's the kind of thing that Defendants are pointing to to say, aha, emulate is more specific than simulate. It's reading an embodiment into the claims without any justification, other than it happens to be there in the spec, and that's what the cases say is a cardinal sin. That whole concept of relative precision, to me, is wrong.

If you look at slide 63 and the subsequent slides, Your Honor, and we have some of this in our brief, what you see is that the definitions for these terms, even technical dictionaries, non-technical dictionaries, they don't show this clear delineation of precise or is it imprecise.

There's a lot of cross-pollination of these words.

We've put examples up on slide 63 and more examples up in slide 64. And I'm sort of breezing through this, Your Honor, and I can focus on this one example in slide 65.

And for the record, this is looking at definitions from MacBook Dictionary. Those are collected on slide 64 and slide 65 looks at one of those definitions for emulate.

The reason we looked at this one in particular is because this was the resource that Dr. Shoemake, Defendants' expert, admitted that he consulted while he was doing his analysis. But then he said he didn't rely on it so he didn't actually identify it in his declaration. It came up

in his deposition. He said, yeah, I looked at that, but I didn't consider it or rely on it. It happened to come up though.

And this just gets at how these two terms, if you try to start specifying some sort of specificity with them, you're going to get things wrong. Sixty-five is a good example. That's the definition of emulate. The first word after the exemplary sentence is imitate, and imitate is the proposed construction for the word simulate that Defendants are proffering.

So, again, it just gets to -- I think, imagining us at trial talking about emulate and simulate and mimic and imitate, or any other two words, it will be a mess. And it will be a mess because, A, there is overlapping coverage of these words, and B, where the patent in the claims take care to kind of delineate what each one means in the concept of that particular claim, Defendants' constructions don't do that. Instead, they conflate two other terms that also have overlapping meaning and assert that one of those is more akin to emulate and the other is more akin to simulate, without any support because it's really not true. Those words have overlapping meaning also.

So in the end, Your Honor, we reach the point where you say to yourself, okay, what's the best thing to do here, and given that the word emulate and the word simulate appear in

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the patent over and over again and the patents make clear
what they mean, given that they're in the claims and the
claims, as part of broader phrases, in every instance
explain to someone what's going on -- they're not alone,
they're part of broader phrases -- we don't think
construction is necessary.
     And we think actually changing these words is just
going to either narrow them in a way that's improper or
create confusion in a way that's improper.
          THE COURT: Okay.
          MR. DEVLIN: And I hope, Your Honor, I also addressed
your question. But we're not saying they're interchangeable.
I'm just suggesting they're overlapping and that the patent
delineates already what they mean in the context of each claim,
and that trying to replace them with other words does not serve
any of the purposes of claim construction, and in fact,
undermines many of them.
          THE COURT: So would you take issue if the Court
construed simulate as emulate?
                    (Pause in proceedings.
          UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are people still there?
Hello?
          MR. DEVLIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. You know what,
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that was the classic example of talking while I'm muted.

THE COURT: Okay. I asked a question and I thought

you were contemplating my question.

MR. DEVLIN: Yeah. No, I was -- I was talking. And you know what? I'll say, Your Honor, it really sounded good. I wish you guys had heard it.

THE COURT: Well, go ahead and do it again and we'll hear it this time.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

So that's a question of first impression obviously, and as I'm understanding it, what Your Honor is saying is, well, if these terms are so — if they're not quite overlapping, maybe it's just easier and cleaner for everyone if we just replace one with the other so we have one term that's used throughout.

At first blush, Your Honor -- I really would love to consult with the team on this, and if this is a possibility, perhaps we can give you a position on it in like a one page letter or something, you know, in a couple of days.

My first impression is that it wouldn't be a huge problem, but I do think the way the claims do operate now, when some claims, dependent or otherwise, have the concept of emulating and simulating in them, emulating one thing and simulating another, I think that might lead to confusion as opposed to resolve any confusion.

That's just my first reaction, but with Your Honor's permission, I would like to think about that for say 24

hours and get back to the Court.

THE COURT: Sure, that's fine. And the reason I ask that, and it's a question I really have for defense, but it evolved into asking you as well, because claims 9 through 11 of the '864 patent seem to me to use simulate and emulate interchangeably, because if you look in the series of the dependent claim, claim 9 uses simulate but then claims 10 and 11, which depend on claim 9, use emulate when describing the same type of action. So that's what led me to believe that they were being used interchangeably.

But I'll give you that opportunity, if you want, since
-- I didn't mean to stump you.

MR. DEVLIN: No, Your Honor, and I'm looking at those claims right now. And we always appreciate these questions because obviously we love an opportunity to address whatever the Court is thinking about.

But if you look at these, it looks like there may be just a subtle difference in usage in the sense that you simulate a user but you emulate action. So simulate a thing, emulate an activity.

Again, this might be a subtle phrasing that helps clarify for people, just to keep things straight with respect to what's happening with the elements in the claims. But, again, that's something it sounds like, if we could have an opportunity to confer on and get back to the Court

on, we very much would appreciate it. 1 2 THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. 3 MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: We'll have a response and then --4 5 MR. REITER: Your Honor --6 THE COURT: Oh, I was just asking my court reporter 7 to see when we need to take a break. When we finish this term 8 we'll take a break, but I was asking her. That's what we'll do. We'll finish with simulate and emulate and then she needs 9 10 a short break and then we can come back and do the rest of the 11 terms. But go ahead. 12 MR. REITER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. Mark 13 Reiter again for Defendants. And I'm sorry for interrupting. 14 Whenever there's silence on something like this, I get nervous 15 that I might have lost the connection. So I apologize. 16 THE COURT: No, y'all have done a great job doing 17 this by telephone. Go ahead. 18 MR. REITER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. So with respect to your last question for Mr. Devlin, 19 20 with respect to claims 9 and 10, I think those terms are 21 used very differently and consistently with what we have 22 explained in our paper and presentation is that there is a 23 level of precision associated with emulate and a level of 24 approximation associated with simulate.

With respect to claim 9, they simulate real users, so

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those users are approximate. It may be some virtual set of users. They don't have to have specific characteristics.

But when we talk about the actual actions, what that user might do -- and, remember, we're talking about acting on a network, so that user might actually send a text. That user might actually receive a phone call. That is precisely mimicked in the emulating claim 10, whereas in claim 9 it's more of an approximate representation of those users. They don't need to have any specific characteristics. So I think claims 9 and 10 are using the terms very consistent with what we have tried to define them as.

And let me go through some things that Mr. Devlin said and then I'll jump into my presentation. One thing that really struck me as he was speaking is he said if we try to put some specificity on these terms, then we're going to get it wrong. If we try to put some specificity on these terms, then we're going to get it wrong.

If we don't put specificity on these terms, then we're going to get it wrong. Then the jury is going to get it wrong. That is the whole purpose of what this process is, is to understand what the scope of these claims are precisely and exactly.

To say, well, it's really hard, I don't know, they're close, so we'll just leave it alone, that's not what this process is about.

And to say that the terms are overlapping but not interchangeable, again, I don't understand what that means. I mean, I'm imagining in my head a Venn diagram, that they're overlapping so a part of them are overlapping, so in some context it's okay to say simulate when you mean emulate and in some context it's okay to say emulate when you mean simulate but in other contexts it's not? That's exactly why these terms need to be construed.

And what the Plaintiff is doing here is looking at these terms in isolation, and we made this point in our brief, and they didn't correct it in their reply brief, that Wapp not once, not once in their arguments do they cite to the intrinsic record, do they cite to the specification in trying to ascertain what these terms mean.

We hear Mr. Devlin talking about not putting specificity on, but we don't hear him explaining when they're interchangeable or when they're overlapping or what exactly they mean.

And we heard him say that maybe there's really not a difference in precision. If there's not a difference in precision, then what is the difference? Because these terms very clearly are used differently in the patents, in the claims.

I heard Mr. Devlin talk about that there's no lexicography here, and I keep hearing this throughout his

presentation, that we haven't seen the inventor act as his own lexicographer and so, therefore, we don't need to do construction.

Well, it's very rare, as the Court understands, that the inventor actually acts as his or her own lexicographer, but yet, nonetheless, it's very common for Courts, in situations where there is no specific lexicography, for the Court to construe the claims.

Finally, I hear over and over again in the presentation that it sounds like if I'm using a word from the specification like emulate in the preamble, then I'm reading something into the claim. But in this case where I'm using a word that's not in the specification, then it's wrong as well. So I can't win for losing. If I read something from or used in the specification, I'm reading it in. If I'm not using a word from the specification, then that's wrong.

So I think very clearly what we have to do is we have to step back and understand what exactly one of skill in the art would have understood these terms to mean in the context of this patent at the time of the alleged invention.

And we cited at page 23 of our brief, Your Honor, the Power Integrations case, 711 F.3d 1348, where the Federal Circuit said that in that case the party argued that just the plain and ordinary meaning should apply, but the opposing party provided expert testimony that testified what

the term meant based on the specification, what the term would have meant to one of skill in the art at the time of the invention. All that the opposing party did in response to that expert declaration is say, no, it's just plain and ordinary meaning. And the Federal Circuit in that case rejected that, saying there was no evidence to contradict the expert's testimony other than the assertion that it's the plain and ordinary meaning.

Then the Federal Circuit in Power Integrations went through the specification and explained what it meant, and that's exactly what we have -- that's exactly what we have done here.

So going back to our slides and starting at slide 47, yes, we use mimic, and what that's intended to represent or to capture is precisely represent. Emulation is a precise representation, and simulate through the word imitate is an approximate representation. That's very consistent with what the specifications disclose and what the extrinsic evidence shows.

We see on slide 48 that Wapp, the Plaintiff, agrees these are nuanced terms. We see that at their reply brief. And there are differences between these limitations, but they've offered no explanation as to what those differences are. And those differences, again, are levels of precision.

Going to slide 49, Dr. Shoemake is the only evidence,

along with some dictionaries -- and I'm going to address what Mr. Devlin said about those dictionaries, because I don't think it's complete. But the only evidence that is presented about the difference in these terms is what Dr. Shoemake explained.

And Dr. Shoemake's declaration is not conclusory at all, as Wapp alleges in its brief. It's very, very detailed. He has 33 pages of detail going through page after page after page and column after column after column of the specification explaining why one of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have construed these terms as mimic and imitate and understood that that's a difference in precision.

So we see that on slide 49, slide 50, just going very quickly, slide 51. He explains with respect to simulate that it is relatively imprecise as compared to emulation.

Slide 52, it is -- the representation of that imprecise modeling is an imitation, not a mimic.

THE COURT: And let me ask -- let me ask you about that, about his opinion. Can you point to anything in the intrinsic record that expresses or implies this distinction between simulate -- or emulate being a relatively precise representation and simulate referring to a relatively imprecise representation?

MR. REITER: Yes, Your Honor. Let's move on. First,

slide 54 shows a difference between these terms, emulate with respect to the mobile device and simulate for the wireless network.

And now skipping ahead -- and we see that consistently, slide 55, 56, how the patent, in the same sentence when using emulate and simulate, they have to mean different things.

Now skipping forward to Your Honor's question, where does Dr. Shoemake get that support in the specification for this level of precision and this level of approximation with respect to emulate and simulate respectively. So first at slide 57 we see --

And I apologize. It looks like, similar to the citations, that got erased.

But from again the '864 patent it says as if the application were running on a mobile device. As if it were actually running on a mobile device. On the right side of slide 57, i.e., as if application 15 or 16 is actually running on a mobile device being emulated. The emulator, at the beginning of the paragraph, it's actually running, as if running.

Mr. Devlin pointed to Table 1, and we think Table 1 is very, very important, and Dr. Shoemake relies on that. We see that in slide 58. There's no approximation with respect to Table 1.

When they talk about the processor speed, it's not talked about approximately 100 megahertz. It says 104 megahertz. When it talks about storage access speed, he doesn't round up or the patentee doesn't round up to six files per second. It's very precise, to the hundredth decimal point, 5.88 files per second.

And Mr. or Dr. Shoemake is clear that this tells one of skill in the art that the emulator has to be precise. It has to be precise.

We don't see this level of precision with respect to simulate. Looking at the claim, slide 59, we see when it's talking about simulate -- and this is claim 1 of the '864 -- and it talks about simulating the network characteristics and the wherein clause, wherein the network characteristics are based on. It's not replicate, not like what we saw with respect to the emulator, but are based on. Dr. Shoemake relies on this.

Then going on to slide 60 we see when the patent is describing things that are simulated, it does it at a very high level description. It doesn't get into the detail of 104 megahertz or 5.88 files per second. It just talks about a very high level of descriptive events, consumer events, incoming events, no level of precision.

We contrast these two disclosures on slide 61 where we have the approximate representation for the simulate versus

the precise representation for emulate, and these are all the things that Dr. Shoemake relies on in paragraph after paragraph of his report to explain how one of skill in the art would have understood these terms and why they should be construed in this way.

Let me pause there and see if I've answered Your

Let me pause there and see if I've answered Your
Honor's question with respect to the intrinsic evidence.

THE COURT: Thank you, yes.

MR. REITER: So now moving on to the extrinsic evidence — and that level of precision is very, very consistent with the extrinsic evidence, and I'm not talking about Dr. Shoemake's extrinsic evidence. I'm talking about dictionaries that explain this.

We see on slide 62 the Wiley Dictionary and the Microsoft Dictionary where simulate, describing an approximate imitation or -- imitation is actually used.

I'll agree, and there's no argument here, that mimic does not appear in the definitions that we see of emulator, but it talks about exactly like another, in the same manner. We don't see that explanation, that level of precision carried into the simulate definitions.

THE COURT: Well, then let me --

MR. REITER: If you --

THE COURT: Let me ask then, how is your proposal of mimic any clearer than the term emulate?

MR. REITER: I thought I did that question. And we think it is. We think that Dr. Shoemake explains it, but perhaps a better construction for emulate is "precisely represent", as we see on slide 62, and for simulate "approximately represent". Maybe that is a better construction. After having gone through all the briefing and heard the complaints about the use of the word mimic and imitate, maybe those two words "precisely represent" and "approximately represent" capture better what we were trying to do.

I think the words mimic and imitate do capture that, and Plaintiff's use of ordinary, non-technical dictionaries

I don't think really does anything here. I think what we have to look at are the technical dictionaries.

So, as I said, Your Honor, I think as Dr. Shoemake explains in paragraph after paragraph that one of skill in the art would recognize "mimic" to capture that precise representation and "imitate" the approximate representation, but maybe, given the unintended confusion that it sounds like we may have caused, "precisely represent" and "approximately represent" would be better.

And carrying that forward and just talking about the dictionaries as extrinsic evidence, if we turn next to slide 64, what we saw in Exhibit 7 of Wapp's brief, opening brief, there was a chart and they pick and choose or chose

definitions from the different dictionaries that Dr. Shoemake thought were most pertinent, but they didn't provide the Court with everything.

So with respect to the Microsoft Dictionary, they cited to emulation, the process of computer device or program imitating the function. But what they left out, interestingly, are the other definitions of emulate or emulator that were contained in the Microsoft Dictionary:

Behave in the same manner, type of computer component to act as if it were another. They left those out. Those were excluded from their chart. I think they were also excluded from Mr. Devlin's presentation.

Same thing on slide 65, the Chambers Dictionary. What Plaintiff identified in their Exhibit 7 in their chart was a zoological definition for simulation, a zoological definition. But, as we see on slide 65, a zoological definition is between the computer definition and the behavioral definition, both of which talk about a representation of systems, investigation of thought processes, program to imitate them.

So what -- what Wapp has done here is very carefully pick and choose, chose, among the technical definitions, picking ones that really aren't even applicable here, a zoological definition, when right in the dictionary three lines above is the computer dictionary.

And when we look at the emulator, it says exactly as we've been talking about all along: To behave as if it were another type of computer.

And the rest of the dictionaries are exactly the same. We see on slide 66, exactly like another, whereas simulation is an imitation.

With respect to slide 67, duplication of the functional capability.

And slide 68, yes, simulate and emulate may be related, but they are related in the sense of different levels of precision. Yes, one might, as we see in the IEEE Dictionary, might also look to see simulate, and in the definition of simulate, you might look to emulate. But that doesn't mean they have the same definition. In fact, they are different definitions.

So, Your Honor, to wrap this up, it is extremely important to understand that these are two different terms. It's extremely important for the jury to recognize that these are two different terms, consistently used differently in the patents. Emulate with respect to the mobile device and simulate with respect to the network. Emulate explaining very precisely how that's supposed to be, because if that mobile device —— remember, the whole idea here is to see whether or not that application that's being developed, whether or not it is going to exceed the resources available

of the mobile device. And if that mobile device is not precisely — is not precisely mimicked, is not precisely reproduced, then that testing is not going to matter. It's not going to help the developer know whether or not his or her application is going to work on that mobile device, whereas whether or not the network approximates an incoming call or an outgoing text or an incoming text, that's not as important because all that needs to be done there is to see that some of the resources of the mobile device are used when that activity, when that incoming text or call happens, and that affects how — what the total resources are for the application being developed.

So it's very clear in the patent that they are two different words, having two different meanings, having two different contexts, one the device, one the network, and it's very important that they be construed differently.

And I'll stop there and see if the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: No. Thank you. Any short response to that before we take a break, Mr. Devlin?

MR. DEVLIN: Yes, Your Honor. I'll be quick.

I won't go into the details about the characterization of our arguments. I think we're not saying that nothing can be construed if it's not actually defined in the spec. The point is those are the very easy ones.

The Defendants have a much tougher burden to show we should be reading things in from the spec when they're not express definitions or there's not some clear disclaimer in the prosecution history, and they're not meeting that burden. That's the point of that recitation.

They mention the -- this confusion about overlapping meanings, and this happens all the time in our language and we deal with it. Theft and burglary have overlapping meanings but they're slightly different. That's just one example of many.

These words have overlapping meanings. It's not confusing when that happens.

Let me talk about the specifics very briefly, Your
Honor, and I just want to focus on the Defendants' slides
and the evidence that they're — that they're pointing the
Court to here about trying to show some specificity or
precision with emulate that doesn't happen in simulate, and
it's not there in the intrinsic evidence, looking at this
evidence through very specific lenses, and I'll explain
exactly what I mean, Your Honor.

For example, on slide 56 there's really nothing there that indicates more specificity for emulate or more precision than simulate. It's just not there.

Same with 57, it's just not there. There's nothing here that suggests saying as if something is running on a

mobile device. Clearly the specification doesn't mean exactly every detail. We know that because Table 1 is just exemplary characteristics of a mobile device. You don't have to have every detail. You can pick a handful of those if you wanted to. So you're approximating something.

And that gets to -- I won't bother with slide 58, but that's the very point. The things they're pointing to being so specific is described as exemplary and says -- again, we said this earlier, you can use less of this. You can be less precise when you're emulating the phone.

Then I want to talk about 59. This is an important one. And these are all Defendants' slide numbers, Your Honor, so Defendants' slide 59. They're looking at claim 1 as an example of why simulate isn't that precise. That's because it's just based on characteristics.

Well, if we look at -- and I don't have it here on a slide here, Your Honor, but claim 20 of the same patent talks about emulating, and the phrase which I didn't read fully before, starting at line 29 -- sorry, 21, line 21 of column 24, reading from claim 20: Emulating each of the mobile devices in real time using respective models. That's the first thing, using a model. Nothing exactly like the phone. Models running on a processor extrinsic to the mobile device. Then it has a wherein clause, just like claim 1 on slide 59. Wherein each of the models is based on

retrieved characteristics.

So this distinction that supposedly is in the claim that makes emulate so precise doesn't exist, Your Honor. It simply doesn't exist.

Then the subsequent slides don't do any better in showing the precision on one to the other.

And, Your Honor, I have a note here that I think there is some precision about some of the network characteristics. Maybe I'll try to grab that on a break and just give a quick cite on the record when we come back.

But even in their own evidence, again -- let me talk about the extrinsic evidence, Your Honor. And we got critiqued for being selective in our definitions. Your Honor, we're showing the problem with Defendants' proposed construction, which is ignoring things. And they're saying, well, you guys were selective and they pulled a few things out.

Your Honor, they were selective as well. If you look at slide 65 and look at the simulation, they — they criticize Wapp because we use something that was somehow, you know, zoological, whereas they highlighted the computer electronics and the behavioral. Well, the word imitate only shows up in the behavioral definition. Psychology I guess is what that is. When we look at the computer definition of simulation, just above it, there is no word imitate.

They're selective.

And the same is true just to the left of that on emulate. There's two definitions of emulate, both for computers. They have selected the bottom one to highlight, but the top one says something kind of broad: A mode in which a device may emulate operational characteristics of a device, e.g., a printer may behave like another type of printer. Not a specific printer, just a type of printer.

So that's the issue here. Again, the Defendants have the burden of showing why their words, their proposed terms — excuse me — their proposed constructions should be adopted. They selectively use the evidence to reach a conclusion, and that's wrong.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I think at this time -- I was talking to my court reporter and she said if we could just take a five minute break. So what I would ask you to do is just put your phones on mute and then we'll come back in five minutes and continue.

Now, I'll just remind you of what the time is. We're only going to take a five minute break here but we need to be done by 5:00 o'clock, so in terms of evaluating how you utilize the rest of the remaining time.

See you back in five minutes.

(Recess.

THE COURT: Okay. We're back in the courtroom. I

assume everyone is still here.

MR. REITER: Yes, Your Honor. Defendants are still on the line.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. We're making sure our lines -- we muted our lines on this end, so we're making sure I can hear everybody. I think I can now. Can y'all hear me?

MR. REITER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we'll go on to the next set of terms.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. So I think we're at slide 67, the claims of simulating or emulating via one or more profile display windows. We see these claims on slide 68 and the claim language in the context of the claim, just for reference, if the Court needs it, and the proposed construction on slide 69.

Again, not to say you could never construe a claim otherwise, but some of the real driving reasons for claim construction simply are not present here, looking at slide 70, Your Honor.

In fact, moving on to slide 71, I think when we try to parse through Defendants' constructions, you end up with a lot more confusion, unnecessary confusion, than if you just use the claim language on its face. We think the claim language is clear.

Looking at slide 72, the first issue, we see the reading in of the proposed constructions for emulate and

simulate. And I think Mr. Reiter is going to address this, Your Honor, but — and I don't think there's a dispute that in this case, regardless of whether the claim uses the word simulate or uses the word emulate, the Defendants are not proposing to dispute between those, but instead, to use the word imitate, which is the proposed simulate definition, not the proposed emulate definition, mimic, even though the word emulate is in the claims.

That's obviously an issue and I think Mr. Reiter will address that. We see it as a problem.

So moving on to slide 74, there's this inclusion of the phrase "in real time" and slide 75 the first issue is that there are embodiments that definitely do not have to visualize something in real time. The profile data may be output as a report, which obviously generally happens later than what's going on as the testing is taking place. And for the record, you see that in the second highlight in the excerpted block on slide 75.

Also, Defendants say that they're not excluding this embodiment because they only use "in real time" when the word "simultaneously" is used, and that helps. But there's still an issue there, moving on to slide 76, that when the word "simultaneously" is there, we see some redundancy inside the construction, while at the same time, in real time, again, phrasing that simply generates confusion.

Lastly, it may be useful to go -- stay on slide 76 for a second just to look at Defendants' proposed construction for this one. The back end of it, after the word real time:

Resources of the mobile device that are available to the application. That we think is over limiting, Your Honor.

The emulation or simulation and the demonstration of that is not necessarily limited to resources that are available to the application.

And so the bullet point there is on slide 76, and at slide 78 -- actually, I'll skip slide 78, Your Honor. I think it's probably easiest to look at slide 80 first. So slide 80 is showing what this visualization might look like. That's Fig. 3 from the patent. And there's this horizontal line, which we emphasized in red, and that's the resources that are available to an application, that's the sum of the power of the device, so to speak, the device being modeled.

Also shown here on this visualization is the resource utilization not just available to but used by the application. Those are the vertical bars, and we see that text from the specification in the lower block on the right-hand side. Again, at slide 80.

So to limit it to resources available to an application only is improper, and there's other support for this. I'll note first, Your Honor, that the Defendants -- I'm looking at slide 81 now -- try to look at the claim language, and in

particular, the dependent claims 13 and 20, to support the argument that somehow this limitation of resources available to an application is appropriate as opposed to used by the application.

But if you look closely, the language really contradicts their construction. This is on slide 82. If you look at claim 13 on slide 82, it talks about displaying data graphically to identify either application performance or network performance or both.

And so any of these -- what's not true for any of this information here from the specification or from the claims is that certainly nothing precludes -- nothing precludes showing resource used by an application, as opposed to available to an application. In fact, the specification demonstrates the opposite, that you can show resource available by -- sorry -- resource used by an application. That's one of the things that you can see visually. So to limit the claims to another option, one other example of the thing that you can show, would be improper.

That's all I have for that, Your Honor, unless the Court has questions.

THE COURT: So let me make sure I understand. So do you feel these limitations could refer to the resources utilized by the application rather than the available resources?

MR. DEVLIN: Your Honor, the specification identifies both things as being shown, and slide 80 probably conveys it best, that there's something on the screen here that shows resource available to, and that's generally represented by that horizontal line.

And the Defendants are suggesting that the claim requires that, it has to be there, just by virtue of the words that we're construing here. Now some claims may require this specifically, resource utilization available to, that horizontal line, but that's not what this element is saying. You just have to show visually what's going on.

And another option to show that from the specs, still looking at slide 80, are the vertical bars. The vertical bars aren't showing resource available. They're showing resource used by.

So if the claim were construed in the way that

Defendants are suggesting here and if -- if a system only
showed vertical bars, as an example, but did not happen to
have this kind of horizontal information available or
another way to represent what was available to the
application, then according to Defendants, that would be
outside the scope of these claims.

But the claims don't say that. The claims don't specify that a thing that has to be shown is what's available to an application, the horizontal line. Certainly

this claim element doesn't say that. Some other claims may recite that expressly, in which case it would be required, but not by virtue of these words.

That's the problem is the Defendants are trying to read in that particular visualization as opposed to another kind of visualization into these words, and that makes it narrower.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor. Mark Reiter again for the Defendants.

Responding to that last point and then I'll cover it in a little more detail as I go through the presentation, but, again, we need to take a step back and recognize what Mr. Poulin purportedly invented. He purportedly invented a system that allows an application developer, developing applications for mobile devices, to use an emulated device and to determine whether or not the device that's being emulated, the device for which the application is being written is going to work on that mobile device.

And if you don't know what the resources of that mobile device are, if you don't know how fast that processor is going to go, you don't know how much memory that device has, you have no idea whether or not that application is going to exceed those resources and crash the device.

If I tell you I have two gallons of water that I want to put in your bucket, will it fit, I need to know how big your bucket is. If your bucket is only a gallon, it will overflow and it's not going to fit. If your bucket is five gallons, I'm going to be fine.

So I have to know how much space is available in your bucket, just like what Mr. Poulin described is you have to know the resources available on the mobile device for which the application is being designed, and that's what that red line, that cap out line is. If you go over it, you have problems.

And if you just know how much you're using or if I just know I have two gallons but I don't know what my capacity is, that doesn't tell me anything. I have to know how much capacity I have.

So I'll go through that in a little more detail, but the other thing I wanted to circle back on, because as Mr. Devlin correctly pointed out, we do use the word "imitate" in this construction to capture the simulate concept. What I think is very, very clear here, and going back to the very first minutes of this telephone conference hearing, is that there is a fundamental dispute between the parties as to what this invention is and what the scope of these claims are. Do they require an emulated device? I think very clearly, as I've explained, they do through the preamble or

at least through the claim language indicative of performance, as I explained before.

And do the claims require a display showing what is available? There is an absolute dispute between the parties that requires resolution.

So now turning to the deck and slide 71, I've presented here the claim language that's being construed. Mr. Devlin did the same thing.

We see in the upper left-hand corner, terms are not sufficiently clear. That was Wapp's argument is that the terms here, displayed simultaneously, visually simulate via one or more profile display windows, was sufficiently clear.

That's not true at all. These terms are unique to the patents and these terms are technical and they are grammatically confusing. Simultaneously visually simulate, via one or more profile display windows, that is very confusing language that has to be construed.

I have spent two years almost working on this case and I still am not sure that I understand it, although I think that our definition captures that.

And to go on to slide 72 where we repeat what Wapp argued in its opening brief, that simultaneously and visually and then emulate and simulate, we've talked about those a lot. Those are not clear.

Profile and display window, these -- that's not the way

we do this. We don't take and parse each individual word and say, oh, well, somebody knows what visually means, and therefore, we don't need to construe the term. We need to construe the term in context as it exists in the phrase, in the claim, in the specification.

Dr. Shoemake explains that there is no understood meaning apart from the patents. We see that on slide 73. So we need to do a construction.

Going back to the Power Integrations case that I talked about before the break, that is the only evidence. Wapp's blanket statement that no construction is necessary, when we have these technical terms and this grammatically confusing phraseology, just falls flat.

Again, on slide 74, Dr. Shoemake again, paragraph 52, he explains that a person of ordinary skill would not understand what it means to simulate via a profile display window. That is the language of the claim, simulate via a profile display window.

And what we saw in Wapp's reply brief, and this is depicted on slides 75 and 76 of my presentation, is they said the word "via" clarifies everything. This is a new argument that they raised. We didn't see this in their opening brief. We didn't see this during the negotiations for the 4-1, the 4-2, the 4-3 discussions.

But "via" -- I looked it up -- means by way of. That's

what it means, quote/unquote, by way of. So looking at this language, looking at the claim that I have here, software configured to simulate via one or more profile display windows, is software configured to simulate by way of a display window. That doesn't make any sense and that's why construction is required here.

And what Wapp seems to be saying is let's ignore what the words in the claim actually are and we'll just substitute "simulate" for "present". Software configured to present via one or more profile display windows a plurality of network characteristics. Okay. That makes sense, but that's not what's written.

Then slide 76 says get rid of the word "via". Software configured to simulate and present in one or more profile display windows a plurality. But that's not what's written, and that's why it's so important here to construe this phrase because it is so confusing. It just doesn't make any sense with the words that are written.

So I think what we need to do is, again, is take a little bit of a step back. Mr. Devlin did this. I'm on slide 77 and we need to think again about what the purported invention is. And so we explain this in our brief and I explained this a little bit at the beginning of my presentation.

The asserted patents explain essentially four concepts.

You play or develop an application that's designed for a mobile device on an emulated device, and you simulate the mobile device working in the network. You simulate network events, such as an incoming call and a text, and then you display in a window — and we saw all of this in Fig. 12. You display in a window the overall resource availability of the mobile device as affected by the network events.

And that's the line at the top, the cap out line that we've talked about. So if those horizontal -- if those vertical bars exceed that horizontal bar, you have a problem.

So you have an application that's being developed. You play it on an emulated device. And, again, we think that's captured in the preamble but at least it's captured in "indicative of" in the body of the claim. And we take into account in the claim language the network characteristics. That's clearly in the claim, the simulation of the network characteristics, and I explained how the patent specifications describe simulation in the context of a network and emulation in the context of the device, and then that's displayed so the app developer can see if his or her program is going to work. And that's what our construction captures. That's exactly what it captures.

And if we go on to slide 78, and this is from Wapp's tutorial, the profiler -- it's talking about a profiler --

monitors simulation on a monitor how the app is utilizing the resources of the modeled mobile phone. How is it utilizing those resources? And that's what our construction captures. Resources of the mobile device that are available as a result of the imitated activity.

And then Wapp's tutorial goes on, as we show in slide 79, that the modeled phone's resources and then it sends that resource utilization to a data display. That's exactly what we have, displaying one or more windows that show the resources of the mobile device that are available for the application, so the app developer can see if the app is going to crash.

Quickly going again through Fig. 3, we see the red line on the top. That's the cap out line. This is the profile data display window or the profile display window as the claim language uses. If you go over that line, you crash, and that's what we see on slide 81. It shows the cap out line that has the device resources available to the application.

Again, from Wapp's tutorial, the second bullet on slide 81, the profile display window allows a user to identify areas within the application that would exceed the resources of the mobile device. Exceed resources, that's the resources available. They agree. They just don't want to agree now.

And we continue on, keeping in mind what the alleged invention is, and taking into account how the network resources consume — or the network characteristics or the network activities consume resources of the mobile device, and you see that in slide 82. As the application plays within model the effects of the mobile device 114 interacting with the network are simulated such that the data display window shows resource utilization.

Then we go to the next slide and the highlighting at the bottom says: So, for example, if the message is received or retrieved while playing the application, certain resources are required to handle that, and therefore, the available resources are reduced.

If you look between 82 and 83, Your Honor, you see that line, that red line goes down between 82 and 83 because the network consumes those resources. There are fewer resources available and it is more likely that the application under development will crash the phone.

This is also captured on slide 84 where we show resource utilization and then the dynamic modification to show actual resource availability. And you see on the far side of the figure on the right side, we have the green bar and the blue bar. The blue bar shows what additional resources are available. We see what's used, but how much more do we have? How much more do we have as a result of

what the network is doing, what the network has consumed of the mobile device? And that's what the purported invention is about.

The same thing on slide 85 with respect to a different embodiment to talk about exceeding the available resources of the mobile device.

So that's where we get the available resources. That's why we think it's very important to capture that in the construction.

Displays is extremely confusing. It doesn't make sense as written, and the construction that we provided is absolutely true to what's disclosed in the patent and what the inventor purportedly invented.

Now, with respect to real-time versus non-real-time, going to slide 86, so there are two embodiments that are disclosed, column seven, line 56, to column eight, line three of the '864 patent. In there we see one embodiment. We highlighted the first one: Profiled data 152 may be displayed in real time as the application is played. Alternatively, the profiled data may be output as a report. That's not shown. Our constructions capture that and the claim language captures that.

So we see on the next slide 87 that the '192 and the '678 claims talk about simultaneously visually simulating, whereas the '864 patent doesn't use the word "simultaneous".

It leaves that out.

And we recognize that there are two different embodiments and these claims are directed to the two different embodiments. We're not trying to read in real-time. We're not trying to read it in at all. We're trying to capture that through the word "simultaneous". And we're not applying it to every claim where simultaneous doesn't appear.

So we believe that for the '678 and the '192 claims, the construction is absolutely appropriate where it's talking about doing it in real-time, is while at the same time displaying in one or more windows, showing in real-time the resources.

And I'm going to get to Wapp's argument, Mr. Devlin's argument that at the same time and in real-time are redundant. They're not, and I'll explain why.

But we believe that "simultaneous" is that hook that the Federal Circuit says requires us to go back to the specification and understand what is meant there.

So Wapp's arguments really kind of boil down to three things. We think they tell half the story by focusing on just resource utilization rather than resource availability.

We think that they're wrong when they talk about the display -- the profile display window displays resources of the network. That is not at all true. It's only displaying

resources available of the mobile device.

And then Wapp is wrongly conflating "at the same time" with "real-time".

So very quickly, and I know I've belabored this point, on slide 89, there is a difference between just showing resource utilization. Resource utilization is not going to show whether or not the application is going to crash the product. You have to know whether or not that resource utilization exceeds the available resources, and that's why available resources is critical and why Wapp is only telling half the story.

Wapp also says in their reply brief at page eight that our construction is wrong because what we've cited confirmed that the profile display window displays resources of the network, and they highlight network, that are available to the application. Well, that's entirely wrong.

If you look at what they cite, column ten, line 65 over to column 11, line two, it says: In one embodiment, capacity line 308 in profile display window 110 is dynamically modified to show actual resource availability to application, resulting from resource utilization by simulated wireless network activity within device model.

In other words, because the network consumes resources of the device, that line, that red cap out line, reduces it.

That's all that this passage says is that in that

embodiment, from the -- the network simulation is taken into account, the cap out line lowers and the resources available to the application of the mobile device are reduced.

Finally, same time is not the same as in real time, and in real time means that it is simultaneously -- real time means simultaneously as the application is played, as the application is played. And something may be displayed at the same time without being in real-time.

And I know we've all forgotten this because we're all stuck at home and not watching sporting events anymore, other than things that happened a long time ago. But if we look at slide 92, we might all remember that a basketball spectator watching a game live sees the player take the shot in real time, while at the same time seeing the shot clock. You see that in slide 92. In real time, the spectator sees that shot, and at the same time, sees the shot clock and tries to see whether or not that shot will be valid.

We see 0.1 seconds on the clock. It looks like it would be a good shot. But if you go to the next slide, the referees are not watching that shot in real time, but at the same time they are watching -- they're reviewing it. So the playback is taken of the shot taken, while at the same time reviewing the shot clock, but that's not in real time.

So there is a difference between real-time and at the same time. Real-time is as it's actually happening. At the

same time doesn't have to be in real-time.

And finally, Your Honor -- and I talked about this at the beginning of my presentation and I didn't hear Mr.

Devlin say anything about in their briefing they say it's not clear that it's a mistake.

But we believe -- and this is consistent with our position that emulate and simulate are two different words and used consistently throughout the specification, and there was a mistake in the '192 patent where it says simultaneously visually emulate network characteristics. That was a drafting error, and it's clear from the prosecution history that it was just a mistake that wasn't -- there was an amendment, and you see that on the next slide, slide 95.

There was an after allowance amendment where the attorney changed the word "hardware characteristics" to "network characteristics", but he failed to change emulate to simulate. So previously it was emulate hardware characteristics, which is entirely appropriate. The emulation occurs of the hardware of the mobile device and that's right, so the word "network" was substituted in for "hardware". But for whatever reason, the word "emulate" was not changed to "simulate", as it should have been.

And absent that, this claim would be invalid because there's no support in the specification for emulating

network characteristics. Again, they are two different words.

We see all of the remaining claims, going to the next slide, slide 96, all of the remaining claims of the '192 are consistent. They are talking about emulating hardware characteristics. They never in any other claim talk about emulating network characteristics.

So it's clear that the word "emulate" in claim 1 should really be "simulate", and that's the way in which we have construed it in our briefing, Your Honor.

And that concludes my presentation. I know I'm running a bit long, and I'll pause and see if the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: No, thank you, Mr. Reiter.

But, Mr. Devlin, I will tell you this. I agree with the defense that these terms do need construction, in the Court's view. And, of course, you haven't given the Court really any construction. And so I'm going to ask you, do you have some construction? Because I think it does need construction, in the Court's view, so the question is where do I come out on this?

MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm looking at the Defendants' proposal right now to see if parts of it would be acceptable, and one option is to -- first of all, having redundancy between at the same time and in real-time I think

can be removed. That's one problem where those -- where those phrases occur.

I'm looking at slide 75, Your Honor, of our presentation, which shows the different claim terms being proposed for construction.

So Defendants' counsel noted some of the claims don't use the word "simultaneously" and some do, but for the ones that do, which is the upper window in slide 73, using "at the same time" and "in real-time" -- and I appreciate counsel's explanation of that, but we just think it's -- that's one issue, to remove that redundancy.

And the other is the limitation available to the application as opposed to also adding an "or" there, that's or used by the application as a result of the emulating activities. The words after "available to the application", to put in "or used by the application".

And then lastly, the word "imitate" being there, both at the start and the end of that, I think you can remove that word and adjust the construction slightly to take out the "while". So at the same time, or choose real-time, displaying one or more windows showing, again, in real-time or at the same time, resources of the mobile device that are available to the application or used by the application, period. The rest of it, as a result of imitated activity, is just to recap.

So that -- and, Your Honor, I can -- I did that off the cuff, but I'm pretty sure we can get that to you within an hour after this hearing, if it wasn't clear.

THE COURT: Well, that's fine.

MR. DEVLIN: So that was my first point. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Any other response?

MR. DEVLIN: Yes, of course. So I really want to focus on this -- so I really responded to "at the same time" and "real-time" already. They're just redundant phrases that don't both need to be there, in our view.

And I talked about imitate, which, again, is just a way to read into this claim element the word imitate -- sorry.

The Defendants' construction on simulate or emulate.

Another possibility, Your Honor, instead of the word "imitate" is just use the word simulate or emulate again in Defendants' proposal, but we'll clear that up and get you something very clean very quickly after this hearing.

But as to this issue of the resources available to, the requirement of this language of the claim, Your Honor, that's just not right, and I want to point to two slides of the Defendant and talk about them. These are Defendants' slides now. The first is slide 90 and that gives us the specification, and we went through a long recitation through the slides in the 80s numbers of all these examples in the

specification that the Defendants are using to try to show that the claims should be so limited as what they're suggesting.

But the problem is they're just examples from the spec. Even if those were the only examples shown, over and over again the Fed Circuit has held that if the specification just shows a single example, that's not a reason to limit the claims to just that one example, when the claim language is naturally broader. That would be wrong.

But it goes beyond that, because what's the real issue here on the quote at the bottom from the specification, on slide 90 of Defendants, is it's talking about showing the utilization by. We get that.

But the first words in this part are "in one embodiment", the specification is making clear this is one thing that can be shown of these red lines, as they're highlighted in red. But that's not necessarily what you have to show. You can show something else. You can just show how the application is using — sorry — the application would be using the resources.

What's the evidence there? Well, in the claims you have the '864 patent up in front of Your Honor, claim 20, page one of these exemplary claims, and this shows, at least as far as the exemplary claim here, but this shows the way that the patent treats what can be shown.

So if we look at, for example, dependent claim 21, we see that one of the things that can be displayed is the resource utilization information graphically using a timeline number to indicate points in time for the execution of the application. And that is a reference to these points in time here in the vertical bars, not just the horizontal lines, but the vertical bars that are also an option of what can be displayed.

Claim 24, also dependent from claim 20, says a little more clearly you can simulate execution of one or more frames of a frame-based application. Again, that's these vertical bars.

Then probably more important, claim 25 talks about identifying one or more frames where the resource utilization exceeds the maximum number of maximum resource availability. So that's a dependent claim.

The notion that you have to show -- necessarily that you have to show when resources exceed available resources and that that's inherent in every claim that visually shows anything is just wrong. The patents say that's an option. It's there as a dependent claim.

And so to read it into this phrase, which doesn't require it, this phrase in particular, that would be improper. That exclusion of the option of simply showing available resources used by an application, not available to

1 an application. That -- that's one of the main problems 2 here. So I'll stop there, Your Honor, unless you have 3 questions on that one. 4 5 THE COURT: No, that's fine. Any quick reply to that 6 before we go on to the next one? 7 MR. REITER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. 8 going to ask for that. 9 THE COURT: I knew you would so --10 MR. REITER: I guess you're getting to know me. It's 11 been just a short while but you're getting to know me. 12 Thank you, Your Honor. 13 So I think very important, in response to what Mr. 14 Devlin said, claim 20 that he was focusing on and the 15 dependence to claim 20 don't have this language that we're 16 focusing on in claims 1, 1 and 1 of the three patents. 17 doesn't have that language. 18 Claim 20 is very clear that it's talking about, as he 19 said, monitoring the application playing to determine 20 resource utilization by the application and displaying that. 21 That's different language than what we see in claim 1 of 22 each of the patents, and instead, claim 1 talks about 23 simulating a plurality of network characteristics indicative 24 of performance of the mobile device when executing the

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application.

That's why it's so important to go back to those figures that I was focusing on, for example, on slide 20, which Mr. Devlin pointed Your Honor back to, is what is happening to the performance of the mobile device is when the network is interacting with the mobile device, that performance of the mobile device is affected. The available resources of the mobile device are reduced. That's what claim 1 or the claim 1s of the various patents are talking about, not what claim 20 and its dependents are talking about.

So looking at claim 20, I agree that's different and I agree that claim 20 talks about resource utilization, but claim 1 does not. Claim 1 doesn't have that language.

Claim 20 doesn't have the language of claim 1. So to compare and contrast those or use claim 20 to construe claim 1 is wrong. It's different embodiments. Different way of characterizing the alleged invention.

So very quickly, again, every embodiment that we disclosed -- and I pointed Your Honor to the In Re: Abbott case that we cited at page eight of our brief. Every embodiment talks about how the available resources are necessary to determine whether or not the application is going to work on a mobile device or whether it's going to crash it. And every -- and in the embodiments, not every embodiment, but in the embodiments in which the network

issues are at play, in which the network issues are at play, then the -- then the performance of the mobile device is at issue.

I don't believe, looking at claim 20, that we see anything about the network, and I'm reading it very quickly. Indicative of performance, emulating the mobile device, running on a processor extrinsic, application playing within the models, monitoring the application playing to determine resource utilization. Nothing about the network, nothing at all.

So claim 20, in this context, is a red herring that has nothing to do with the construction of claim 1. And I'll stop there and see if Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: No, that's good. Are we ready to go on to "configure to"?

MR. DEVLIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Devlin, before we start there, let me just say to try to help, because of the shortness in time, I agree that this needs to be construed also, and I don't necessarily see a problem with, in part, Defendants' construction of saying configure to would mean actually program to. So that's my thinking going in here, so I give that to maybe help hone your arguments.

MR. DEVLIN: Sure, Your Honor. I guess if I were to offer up a proposed construction on the fly here, I would just

remove "actually". Either programmed or implemented with hardware and I would say and/or software obviously, to make sure they're not mutually exclusive. I don't think anyone would really try to make that argument, but if we're going to be precise, let's do it.

You know, in our view the word "actually" is a little bit confusing like what it means? How do you actually program something as opposed to just programming? How do actually implement something? What does that mean beyond just implementing it in general?

So with the removal of that word, I think -- and, again, this is one where maybe we can, without argument, put in a proposal to Your Honor after the phone call, you know, within the next two hours or overnight or whatever makes sense for Your Honor, just so you have a clear record of our proposal, but we could do that without argument.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MR. DEVLIN: I think this one's more clear than the last one in the sense that I think if we remove the word "actually" it would be -- I feel 90 percent confident we would be okay.

THE COURT: So you're okay with -- let me make sure I understand. You're saying right now you think you would be okay just saying "configure to" being "programmed to"?

MR. DEVLIN: Yeah, I would just literally remove the

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word "actually" from their construction, and then I guess I would change the "or" to "and/or". So the result would be programmed or implemented with hardware and/or software to. THE COURT: Okay. Let me make sure the record is clear. You're okay with their construction if we remove the word "actually"? MR. DEVLIN: Correct. And, again, if I could have an hour at least to ruminate on this after the call, Your Honor. If I can't, then the -- the proposal we would make would be remove the word "actually" and change the word "or" to "and/or", those two changes. THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask, Mr. Reiter, what would your thoughts be on that? Can we come to an agreement on that or no? MR. REITER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Reiter again. I don't think so. My colleague, Mr. Robb, if it's okay with the Court, is going to address this term and the remaining two terms, so I'll introduce Mr. Robb to cover this question. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Thank you, Your Honor. So the term MR. ROBB: "actually" is taken specifically from the case law, and this comes from a long body of case law that recognizes that "configure to" is more narrow than say "capable of". And to

emphasize that point, the term, the Courts use phrases like

"actually programs to" in the case of the two EDTX cases we cite.

Another example is in Typhoon Touch Tech, which is a Federal Circuit case that we cite, and it interprets configure to as requiring that it must do something.

So the problem here, the claim language is largely devoid of structure. It's a software -- it's a testing system with software configured to, so software is about as generic of a term as you can get.

The patentee intentionally chose the phrase "configured to" which has an established meaning in patent law as being particularly narrow. And it's not the case that this limitation can be met if a customer tweaks and configures and customizes and does all these different things in a way that the product is not naturally implemented, right? The product has to actually do this thing. It has to. It must do this thing.

And so that point of emphasis, I think, is important for informing the jury, which doesn't have the context of this established meaning in patent law, to explain to them what is meant by this phrase.

And then I'll just say on the "and/or" part, I think and/or is redundant with "or". It can be implemented in hardware or software. Our proposed construction is agnostic to those two, and I think and/or is a grammatically

imprecise term that causes confusion.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Devlin, do you want to respond to that? I will say that I know that I think the Defendants in their response brief indicated the Federal Circuit case Aspex. It didn't deal with the exact terminology in terms of defining this, but this idea of "configure to" is narrow. So if you want to respond to Mr. Robb.

MR. DEVLIN: Yeah, the -- the case law that really is is at the heart of this is this question of whether something can be just capable of something, and there's a couple of different layers to that.

So one thing Mr. Robb said that caught my attention is that somehow someone actually has to use this in a certain way. I don't think that's right. I think if -- if my Microsoft Word program is able to import an Excel spreadsheet, which I've never done, as long as that functionality is operative and I can do it if I wanted to, I think that would be within the scope of the claim.

If someone -- these cases with "configured to" or "capable of" and so forth, it generally relates to someone's -- you know, to remove the ability to do something in the code, does that still qualify. I don't think -- I mean, what's the point? I mean, there's really nothing to do about it right now, I don't think, Your Honor, but I wanted to note the point for the record, that there may be a

disagreement in the future around that.

point.

Then just in general in terms of using one case and one patent's extrinsic record to -- to construe the same terms in another patent with a different extrinsic record, the claims in those cases are very different than the claims here, and we don't think they're necessarily controlling. I don't think any patent -- any case of a patent with a totally different intrinsic record is controlling as to another patent. The intrinsic record is what controls. And there's nothing here in the intrinsic record that says these words or makes these words necessary here.

"actually", which I think will create confusion. The "and/or" we may not have a dispute. As long as I -- I just heard from Defendants they're not going to make the argument that something that's both hardware and software implementation is not going to be excluded from this -- I think that's what I heard from them -- as long as we never hear that argument, I think we're fine. I don't really care whether it's "and/or". It feels like we're on the same page.

THE COURT: Mr. Robb, anything else on this?

MR. ROBB: Yes, if I may respond briefly just to one

The point about the different technologies, so Radware

answers this question. The long line of Federal Circuit cases answer this question.

So in patent law, independent of any given technology or any given patent, "configured to" has an established understanding of being particularly narrow and narrower than "capable of". And I think the best way to communicate that well-understood, narrow meaning is through the phrase "actually programmed" to do something.

It's not enough that it could be or might hypothetically be. It must be actually programmed to do A, B and C, and that's the construction that's been adopted by courts in this district and that's the construction the Defendants propose.

THE COURT: But you can't cite me any Federal Circuit decision or any definitive statement from the Federal Circuit that "configured to" means "actually programmed", can you?

MR. ROBB: So the -- not specific. The closest case is Typhoon Touch Tech, which is another case we cite. Typhoon Touch Tech, the case uses the phrase "configured to" and the Court construes it as "it must", so it must do this thing.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The last two terms deal with indefiniteness. I didn't know if defense wants to go first, Mr. Robb, on these last two and then the Plaintiff can go, or --

MR. ROBB: Sure, defense is happy to go first.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROBB: So starting with "the software",

Defendants contend that the software is indefinite as used in

certain claims.

Turning to slide 106, you see claim 1 and claim 2 of the '678 patent. You see "a software testing interface" in claim 1 and in claim 2 you have "the software as configured".

So the question of what does the software refer to?

Does it refer to the software testing interface? Does it refer to the overall system for testing?

I would make the point that in Plaintiff's opening brief in connection with the "configured to" language, they make the point that the whole -- the patents, the claims, everything is directed to software systems. Now, on the one hand, we whole-heartedly agree with that. The systems are directed to software systems, right? The testing is done on an emulated software system, not on a physical hardware device.

But the system -- so the system overall is a software system. And so does the software refer to the overall software system, or does it refer to the specific software testing interface? Or does it refer to some third module of software, the profile display window or something else?

Turning to slide 107, we see that the ambiguity is

actually compounded by dependent claim 48. You have software in the dependent claim being capable of importing real world network profiles. Now, this is inconsistent with how one would typically think of a software testing interface, right? The testing interface, the user interface that the user is working with is the optical display. You see the profile display windows, those sorts of things.

You would think that the software module that is doing the importation of the network profiles is going to be something on the back end, something under the hood, but something there that's not the testing interface.

So it's, again, unclear. Does the software that's doing this particular thing, must it be a part of the software testing interface, or if any software in the whole system does this step, is that enough to satisfy the claim limitations?

So on slide 108 we see Wapp's arguments, so Wapp points to the '864 patent and says, well, in the '864 patent, that answers the question because there you have software configured to simulate in claim 1, and in dependent claim 2, the software is further configured. They say because the software in claim 2 refers up to software configured to in claim 1, that that must mean that the software in claim 2 of the '678 patent refers up to a software testing interface configured to in claim 1 of the '678 patent.

This argument does them more harm than good. So in the independent claims, "a software testing interface configured to" must mean something different than "software configured to", right? If they use different language in the different claims, then there's a presumption that they mean something else.

So "software configured to" is of course broader than "software testing interface configured to". So "software testing interface" is narrower.

So if the software is configured, as using claim 2 of the '678, refers to the software testing interface, you now have a disconnect between the software of the two claim 2s, right? You're using the same language to refer to two different things. Or when the narrowed software in the independent claim 2 requires software testing interface, right?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Robb --

MR. ROBB: This is not --

THE COURT: Mr. Robb, let me go ahead and stop you.

Let me ask, why isn't it fair to read these claims as reciting
a testing interface that is implemented in software? Why isn't
it reasonably clear that the antecedent basis for the software
is the software testing interface?

MR. ROBB: So the software testing interface is implemented in software, of course, but there are other

software modules in the system that are also definitionally implemented in software, right? The whole system as a whole is a software system.

So the software -- I think the fact that the software interfaces implemented in software doesn't answer the question of whether the software of dependent claim 2 refers to that particular software module or some other software module where we know, and Wapp admits, that the system as a whole is a software system.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. ROBB: That's all I have to say on that claim, in the interest of time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DEVLIN: Your Honor, Tim Devlin. I'll be very brief here and we can just stay on the Defendants' slides so we don't have to look at ours.

Looking at slide 107 right now, I think this sort of negates the argument -- oh, by the way, claim 45 itself at the end recites what's highlighted in claim 48 by Defendants', the software can import real-world mobile network profiles. I don't think there's anything special about claim 48 here.

But looking at it and looking at the highlighted terms, this to me seems abundantly clear that the antecedent basis for the software in claim 48 and also at the end of claim 45

is the software testing interface.

I think Defendants would have an argument if the word "software" was used anywhere else in these highlighted terms. If it said a software system for testing and then it said a software testing interface and later said the software, well, now you might have some ambiguity. But I don't think you do here. I think it's very clear that the antecedent basis for the software is a software testing interface. I can't see how you would read this claim any other way.

And with respect to slide 108, the suggestion from defense counsel was that we say this answers the question. It doesn't answer the question. It just informs the same thing. If you look at the analogous claims in another patent, you see the same structure that one would naturally draw anyway from the claims that recite software testing interface.

So for us this is just additive, cumulative evidence that there really is no antecedent basis question here. We certainly won that result in invalidity, so that's it.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Robb, any quick response before we go to the last one?

MR. ROBB: Sorry. Give me one second.

Let me potentially come back to that. In the interest of time, I want to move on to "the test", because I think

we can handle this very quickly, and then rather than look through my notes, I can make the point in a little bit.

So for "the test", this is pretty straightforward. The test we think is indefinite for lacking antecedent basis.

Turning to claim 111 -- sorry -- slide 111, dependent claim 9, it requires that an event occurred during the test.

During is the key language. So in order to know if something occurs during the test, you need to know the metes and bounds of when the test starts and stops.

And there is no answer provided anywhere in the specification or anywhere in the claims as far as what is the scope of the test. In fact, the specification says that there are potentially hundreds of instances where you need to run the process of evaluating whether the application crashes or doesn't crash. So, for example, if each of those hundreds of processes, are those all separate tests or are they part of the same test?

And, again, it's an important distinction, because if it's all a part of the same test, if there's one super test, right? Then the one or more events that occur during the test, essentially any time the event occurs, it would be during the test.

On the other hand, if you narrowly define "the test" to be something like one instance or one iteration, then you — it's a lot less clear that it would be during the test. And

by not providing any metes and bounds to what the scope of the test is, it is wholly unclear whether the events would happen during that test.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. This claim ultimately depends on claim 1, because we're dealing with the test in claim 9, which recites -- claim 1 recites a system for testing. So why isn't it reasonably clear that the test in claim 9 is the test that's carried out by the recited system?

MR. ROBB: Right. So the problem is that it's a system for testing, and it is, you know, the test carried out by the system. But by not more accurately defining what the test is, what the antecedent basis of the test is, you don't know what the scope of that test is. So you know you have a system for testing, but you don't know have I run one test or have I run a hundred tests. And without knowing that, you don't know whether an individual event that occurred, occurred within the scope of the test, right? Or during the test that claim 9 requires.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Devlin?

MR. DEVLIN: Very briefly, Your Honor. I think Your

When the system is operating to do what is recited in the claims, there's a test going on. The question of whether there's one test or multiple tests, that's just not even a material question. This is a compromising claim, and

Honor has identified what's the right concept here.

that carries down through -- claim 1 uses the words, and of course, that carries down through the recitation in claim 9.

And so if it happens for some tests that the user ever wanted to define the scope of a test, whether you want to look at that as a broad set of activities that would go on or whether you want to look at each one of them individually as a test, it doesn't matter, because if this happens during any one at that time, it's happening during the test.

And even if we were to define test conceptually as some narrow thing so that sometimes this doesn't happen, it just doesn't matter, because it's a comprising claim.

In other words, all of that is a lot of legal analysis that is inapplicable. This issue of one or multiple tests, it's just immaterial as to what's going on here in this claim and whether it's going to be met.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask --

MR. DEVLIN: And --

THE COURT: Let me ask this though.

MR. DEVLIN: Yes.

THE COURT: I mean, I guess you're not conceding, but what is the explicit antecedent basis for the test in claim 9?

MR. DEVLIN: I think it's the activity that is defined by claim 1. So if you look at those two things together, they define certain things going on, and that's the test that's being done on the system for testing, that the

system for testing requires it to do certain things. So when those required things are going on, then if what's recited in claim 9 happens, then you infringe.

THE COURT: Okay. So do you consider the preamble of claim 1 to be limiting?

MR. DEVLIN: Yes. As I said before, Your Honor, we don't -- we're fine with it being limiting. I said the Court has already said that --

THE COURT: No, I know that, but I guess I'm trying to figure out about -- it doesn't really cite any particular test. So it's limiting, the system being for testing, but it doesn't cite any particular test. Isn't that a problem?

MR. DEVLIN: Well, it's technically -- there's no word "a test" in here, so it's a potential problem. That is, technically there's an absence of appropriate antecedent basis.

But what the law says is that's not an invalidating problem unless someone could not understand what the claim meant. And we submit that case law in our brief and we cited it in our slides, Your Honor, but for the sake of brevity, I won't bother pulling it up, but it's there.

And here -- and this gets back to the preamble point also -- is limiting. Well, you should construe a claim to preserve validity. So the answer is if this antecedent basis issue depends on that, then yes, it should be deemed limiting. And I think that's probably the case here,

because the test does have some relationship obviously to what's recited in claim 1, the system for testing. Again, those aren't the only words. The system for testing, comprising something. And claim 8 depends from that and adds more something, and those somethings, what's going on there, would be the test.

And claim 9 depends from claim 8 and refers to what's going on in claim 8. So when that's happening, that's the test. Basically when the system is being used for the purpose recited in the claims, that's a test, because that's what the system is for, as recited in claim 1, a system for testing.

So while the Defendants are correct and Your Honor's point is correct, there is no actual antecedent basis for the term "the test", that doesn't end the inquiry. The question then arises, would someone of ordinary skill in the art be confused about this, and I say given the additional recitations of claims 1 and 8, combined with the words of the preamble, I think the answer to that is no. Someone of ordinary skill in the art would have an understanding of what the scope of this claim is, given the rest of that information.

THE COURT: Thank you. Any response?

MR. ROBB: If I may just respond to a few points?

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. ROBB: So, first, I think the suggestion was that the standard was it could not be understood. Of course, that's not the standard. After Nautilus the standard is whether it would inform a person of skill in the art with reasonable certainty about the scope of the claim. And I think this conversation demonstrates that it would not inform someone of reasonable certainty of the scope of the claim.

Second point, so the case law, Mr. Devlin referenced Bose. In Bose there was an antecedent reference to an ellipse and then a subsequent reference to an ellipse having a major diameter. Of course, all ellipses have major diameters, and so the fact that the antecedent basis only said an ellipse, not an ellipse having a major diameter, did not make it unclear what the ellipse having a major diameter referred to, because all ellipses have major diameters.

Here that's -- it's a very different problem. So as Your Honor indicated, there is no antecedent basis for the test, right? It's a system for testing, but the word "test" itself does not appear anywhere in the claim before it, and there's simply no -- and I should also say that the fact that it's a comprising of claim, right? Doesn't obviate the need for an antecedent basis.

At the end of the day, without knowing what the scope of the test is, we don't know whether a particular set of actions by a user infringes the claim. The claim applies if

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certain events happen during the test, and without knowing
     what the scope of the test is, it's simply not possible to
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     know whether it occurred during the test. Nothing in the
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     claim, nothing in the specification provides any guidance on
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     that point.
               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. ROBB:
                          I'm sorry. One final point. We talked
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     about a number of different kinds of tests today, and, you
     know, so not knowing which test we're talking about, which
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     version of the test, which iteration of the test, you simply
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     don't know whether or not it happened during the test.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything else on this
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     one?
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              MR. DEVLIN: Nothing further from Plaintiff, Your
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     Honor.
            Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Anything else from Defendants?
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               MR. REITER: Nothing further from Defendants, Your
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     Honor.
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               THE COURT: Well, thank y'all very much. I thought
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     this worked out. It's better in person, but certainly this was
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     a good substitute and we seemed to be able to -- seemed like we
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    handled it fine.
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          So I will -- my goal is always to get a decision out
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     within 30 days at the latest. Usually it's before that.
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     Let me ask, I know, Mr. Devlin, you were going to maybe want
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     to submit something else after conferring with your team on
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     a couple of different items. If you're going to submit
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     something one way or the other, can you do that by noon
     tomorrow?
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               MR. DEVLIN: Yes, Your Honor, we will do that.
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               THE COURT: And then if that requires any kind of
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     response, if Defendants can submit something, if they feel
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     there's a need to respond, by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow then?
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               MR. REITER: Could we have until 9:00 o'clock the
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     next day, Your Honor?
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               THE COURT: Yes, that's fine, not a problem.
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               MR. REITER: Not 9:00 a.m. By 9:00 p.m.
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               THE COURT: That's fine.
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               MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
               THE COURT:
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                          Okay. Y'all have a great day. Stay
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     safe, and thank you.
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               MR. REITER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MR. DEVLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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     I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
22
     the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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Date

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Jan Mason